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Genetically engineered (GE) seeds are central to the debates around agricultural 
biotechnology, and continue to be rapidly adopted across the globe. At the same time that 
GE crops increase in acreage, the organic market has become one of the fastest growing 
sectors of the American food industry. While biotechnology companies claim there is a 
successful “coexistence” of GE crop technologies and organic crops, many organic 
producers are already challenged by keeping unwanted GE traits out of their fields. Still,  
little attention has been given to the role of regulations in the face of organic  
contamination by genetically engineered material. This paper looks at the National 
Organic Program (NOP) and Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology, and analyzes whether they are adequate for protecting the integrity of 
organic food in the face of genetic engineering, using a relatively new GE crop, Roundup 
Ready (RR) alfalfa, as a case study. Alfalfa is an essential component to the organic 
livestock industry, especially to organic dairy, where the demand has grown faster than 
the supply. This paper reveals that the organic alfalfa industry is at risk of contamination 
by RR alfalfa, and that part of the risk can be attributed to the inadequacy of the two 
regulatory frameworks, as both do not go far enough to keep GE crops contained and the 
integrity of organic products protected. These findings resulted from an extensive review 
of the pertinent laws and regulations, a review of the U.S.’s experience with GE crop 
technology, and research into the potential implications of introducing RR alfalfa. 
Recommendations include making changes to the two frameworks’ approach to 
regulation, including: making improvements to the regulation of GE crops both before 
and after they enter the marketplace; encouraging discussion within the organic industry 
about current threats to the integrity of organic, and the pros and cons of establishing a 
tolerance level and testing system; and taking a precautionary approach to RR alfalfa by 
performing a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and pulling it from the market 
until all risks are addressed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The advent of agricultural biotechnology in the mid-1980s was met by both enthusiasm 
and criticism, and continues to spark debate across the globe. Genetically engineered 
(GE) seeds are central to these debates, which have drawn attention to a variety of social 
and ecological issues that have as much to do with science as they do with cultural values 
and ethics. Even in light of these debates, GE seeds continue to be readily adopted. For 
instance, in 2000, 54 percent of soybeans planted in the U.S. were a GE variety; by 2006, 
this percentage was 89 percent.1 More GE plantings are taking place abroad, too. In 
2005, 21 countries planted GE crops on over 220 million acres, an 11 percent increase 
from 2004 (or 22 million acres).2 The Grocery Manufacturers of America estimates that 
70 percent of food on grocery shelves contains ingredients from GE crops.3
 
Genetic engineering differs tremendously from traditional breeding mechanisms. The 
National Research Council cites the general definition of a genetically engineered 
organism as “an organism that has been modified by the application of recombinant DNA 
technology.”4 Unlike other breeding methods, genetic engineering operates at the cellular 
and molecular level, and makes it possible to select and transfer a single gene, sometimes 
between unrelated species.5 For example, herbicide-tolerant plants are engineered to 
express a gene derived from a soil bacterium, and other examples (though not on the 
market) include tobacco and jellyfish genes in tomato plants and a soybean gene in 
                                                 
1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Adoption of Genetically Engineered 
Crops in the U.S.: Soybeans, Retrieved May 2, 2006, from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechcrops/extentofadoptiontable3.htm  
2 International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech applications. (2005). ISAAA Briefs No. 34-
2005, Retrieved on May 3, 2006, http://www.isaaa.org/kc/bin/briefs34/es/index.htm   
3 Barboza, David. (2000, June 4). Modified foods put companies in a quandary [Electronic version], The 
New York Times, Retrieved May 5, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/health/060400food-quandry-health.html    
4 National Research Council. (2004). Biological Confinement of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
5 Ibid.; The process and products of recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology is referred to by several names, 
including “genetically engineered (GE),” “genetically modified (GM),” “genetically modified organism 
(GMO),” “bioengineered,” “biotech,” and “transgenic.” These labels are interchanged throughout this 
paper, but preference is given to “genetically engineered” and “transgenic.” 
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lettuce.6 Although agricultural biotechnology encompasses a host of organisms, including 
fish, insects, and animals, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the regulation of 
GE plants, specifically those engineered to tolerate the popular herbicide, Roundup 
(generic name of the active ingredient is glyphosate). 
 
Almost all GE crops currently on the market fall under the “first generation” category of 
plants, which provide farmer-oriented traits, such as herbicide-tolerance, virus-resistance, 
and insect-resistance. The vast majority of these varieties involve corn, soybean, canola, 
and cotton plants. Few GE fruits and vegetables have been approved for commercial sale. 
In fact, many of these are no longer on the market despite regulatory approval. “Second 
generation” GE crops are engineered to express traits specific to nutritional and 
pharmaceutical composition—“consumer-oriented” traits. The first of these next 
generation plants is a soybean intended to reduce or eliminate trans fatty acid in a variety 
of food products.7  
 
While biotechnology companies claim there is a successful “coexistence” of GE seed 
technologies and conventional8 (non-GE) seed, opponents of genetic engineering believe 
the technology poses serious challenges for organic producers,9 and, according to a 
leading agroecologist, is one of the main barriers to achieving a truly sustainable 
agriculture.10 At the same time that there is increased adoption of GE crops, the organic 
market has become one of the fastest growing sectors of the American food industry.11 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates it is growing by 20 
                                                 
6 Gene information taken from an overview of California field trial data at the Information Systems for 
Biotechnology website. (2006). “Field Test Releases in the U.S.,” Retrieved on November 16, 2006 from, 
(http://www.isb.vt.edu/cfdocs/fieldtests1.cfm)    
7 USA: Kellogg moves to low linolenic oil to cut trans fats, (2005, December 9). Retrieved on May 2, 2006 
from http://www.organicconsumers.org/ge/soyoil121205.cfm
8 Throughout this paper, I refer to seeds derived from traditional breeding methods as “conventional” or 
“non-GE.”  
9 Numerous producers throughout the world farm organically and rightfully call themselves organic 
farmers, yet choose not to be certified. For purposes of this paper, “organic producer” or “organic farmer” 
generally refers to those who are certified and regulated under the NOP. 
10 Altieri, Miguel A. (2001). Genetic Engineering in Agriculture: The Myths, Environmental Risks, and 
Alternatives, Oakland, CA: Food First Books. 
11 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Organic agriculture gaining ground 
[Electronic version], Retrieved on April 20, 2006 on 
www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/feb03/findings/organicagriculture.htm.  
 2
percent or more each year, with some individual sectors, such as organic dairy, growing 
by 60 percent in some parts of the country.12 In 2003, the U.S. recorded over two million 
acres of certified organic farmland, a 63 percent increase from 1997.13 Because the 
USDA National Organic Program (NOP) does not allow GE seed and feed in certified 
organic systems, consumers rely on organic products as alternatives to food products that 
contain GE ingredients.14
 
Many organic producers are already challenged by keeping unwanted GE traits out of 
their fields, and feel coexistence is premised on the unfounded belief that non-GE 
markets will accept an increasing amount of GE material in products.15 In June 1999, the 
British government’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food released a report that 
showed wind-borne pollen and bees could carry GE genes for miles, raising concerns that 
it might become impossible to guarantee foods as GE-free.16 Several recent events 
validate this concern, 17 including the discovery of an unapproved rice variety in the U.S. 
food supply, half of which is exported.18 This announcement in 2006 caused Japan to halt 
                                                 
12 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Organic agriculture gaining ground 
[Electronic version], Retrieved on April 20, 2006 on 
www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/feb03/findings/organicagriculture.htm; Mack, S.K. (2005, July 23). 
Demand exceeds supply of organic milk in Maine [Electronic version], Bangor Daily News, Retrieved on 
April 12, 2006, from 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/bangor/access/871509821.html?dids=871509821:871509821&FMT=ABS&F
MTS=ABS:FT&date=Jul+23%2C+2005&author=SHARON+KILEY+MACK&pub=Bangor+Daily+News
&edition=&startpage=1&desc=Demand+exceeds+supply+of+organic+milk+in+Maine  
13 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Data Sets: Organic Production, 
Retrieved on October 5, 2006 (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/organic/)  
14 In 1997, USDA received over 280,000 comments (mostly from consumers) opposing the agency’s 
inclusion of genetically engineered organisms within its definitions of what constitutes “organic” in its 
proposed NOP rule. 
15 Vermont Public Interest Research Group. (2003, December). Blowing in the Wind, The Road to 
Extinction for Vermont’s Organic Farms: Testing Confirms Genetic Pollution of Organically Grown Corn 
[Electronic version], Montpelier, VT: Author, Retrieved on April 17, 2006, from  
www.gefreevt.org/images/downloads/blowing%20in%20the%20wind%20report.pdf    
16 Waugh, P. (1999, June 16). Official Data Reveals GM Crop Risks [Electronic version], UK Independent, 
Retrieved on April 12, 2006, from http://www.intekom.com/tm_info/rw90620.htm#06  
17 GeneWatch UK and Greenpeace International. (2005). GM Contamination Report, A Review of Cases of 
Contamination, Illegal Planting, and Negative Side Effects of Genetically Modified Organisms, Retrieved 
on April 1, 2006 from 
www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/gm_contamination_report.pdf  
18 Weiss, Rick. (2006, November 6). Biotech rice saga yields bushel of questions for feds [Electronic 
version], The Washington Post, Retrieved on November 10, 2006, from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/05/AR2006110501092.html; Transgenic 
rice discovery disrupts U.S. exports [Electronic version]. (2006, August  29). Food Chemical News, 
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rice imports from the U.S., and rice growers affected by the contamination wasted no 
time in filing a lawsuit against Bayer CropScience, the manufacturer of the rice variety.19  
 
My research question is especially interesting and timely in light of a recently approved 
GE alfalfa variety. In June 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced 
its approval of Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa, a genetically engineered variety that 
tolerates glyphosate, the main ingredient in the Monsanto Company’s trademark 
herbicide, Roundup. It is the first genetically engineered perennial plant to be 
commercialized for widespread planting in the U.S., and was produced by Monsanto in 
partnership with the largest alfalfa seed company, Forage Genetics International (a 
subsidiary of Land O’Lakes).20  
 
Alfalfa is an essential component to the organic livestock industry. Milk cows accounted 
for over half of the total number of certified animals in 2001, and the total number of 
certified organic livestock, including beef cattle, pigs, sheep and lambs, increased by 572 
percent between 1997 and 2003.21 Several events show the demand for alfalfa-derived 
organic products is growing. For example, in 2005, California experienced a shortage in 
organic feed, and is looking to North Dakota to increase production of corn, soybeans, 
barley, peas and alfalfa.22 California currently has to import organic feed from China and 
South America to meet its rapidly growing demand for organic livestock and poultry 
markets. The U.S. is also experiencing a shortage in organic milk.23 While the shortage is 
mostly attributed to a lack of certified organic cows, this demand is implicitly coupled 
with a need for more organic alfalfa hay.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Retrieved on November 10, 2006, from 
http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/summaries/display.php3?NewsID=1020  
19 Weiss, Rick. (2006, November 6). Biotech rice saga yields bushel of questions for feds [Electronic 
version], The Washington Post, Retrieved on November 10, 2006, from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/05/AR2006110501092.html; 
20 Genetically engineered papaya, grown primarily in Hawaii, is also a USDA-approved perennial GE 
plant. 
21 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006). Data sets: organic production 
[Electronic version], Retrieved on October 5, 2006, from http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/organic/; (Total 
certified organic livestock equaled 18,513 in 1997, 74,435 in 2003.) 
22 California organic farmers looking to North Dakota for feed. (2005, May 10). Valley City Times-Record. 
23 Weinraub, J. & Nicholls, W. (2005, June 1). Organic Milk Supply Falls Short [Electronic version], 
Washington Post, Retrieved on June 20, 2005, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/05/31/AR2005053100363.html  
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My interest in this topic stems from over five years of research and work in the non-profit 
sector on agricultural biotechnology issues. I developed an interest in the regulation of 
GE crops during a two-year position at the Center for Food Safety, a non-governmental 
organization headquartered in Washington, DC that encourages the U.S. government to 
take a precautionary approach to GE technologies, often through legal initiatives. I began 
researching RR alfalfa almost two years ago, when I began to follow the development of 
the new variety for a paper in a graduate course, and subsequently continued the research 
through a fellowship at the Western Organization of Resource Councils in Billings, MT. 
There, I researched the development of RR alfalfa; talked to organization members 
(ranchers who grew or were familiar with alfalfa production) about their perspectives on 
RR alfalfa; wrote newsletter articles and memos on the potential implications of 
introducing RR alfalfa; gave presentations on RR alfalfa to chapter groups around the 
West; and wrote a publication entitled A Guide to Genetically Modified Alfalfa.24
 
While there are a lot of controversies around agricultural biotechnology and the organic 
standards, little attention has been given to the role of regulations in the face of organic 
contamination by genetically engineered material. An important exception is attorney 
Michelle Friedman’s law review article on contamination issues in the context of the 
NOP: You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, which has been a 
valuable resource in my research. The purpose of this paper is to look at two regulatory 
frameworks—the NOP and Coordinated Framework—and identify if they protect the 
integrity of organic products in the face of genetic engineering, using RR alfalfa as a case 
study. That is, are the frameworks sufficient for keeping the two burgeoning industries 
separate in the field and marketplace? 
 
This paper is divided into three chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the NOP and 
Coordinated Framework, and describes how they address genetically engineered crops. In 
2002, USDA introduced the NOP, the first federal standards to be implemented for the 
                                                 
24 Hubbard, Kristina. (2006). A guide to genetically modified alfalfa, Western Organization of Resource 
Councils, www.worc.org/issues/art_issues/alfalfa_guide/alfalfa_guide.html. 
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purpose of providing a uniform organic standard given the previous patchwork of 
certification, and to protect the integrity of, and consumers’ confidence in, certified 
organic food. When GE crops were introduced, no new laws were implemented to 
regulate them. Instead, three government agencies—USDA, Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—regulate GE 
crops under a patchwork of existing laws, most notably the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics 
Act; The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; The Toxic Substances 
Control Act; and the Federal Plant Protection Act. 
 
Chapter two explores the case of RR alfalfa by first describing the regulatory process that 
Monsanto and Forage Genetics went through to introduce it, followed by an analysis of 
the potential implications of introducing it, including agronomic, environmental, and 
economic effects. The analysis draws from examples of other RR crops that have been in 
the environment and marketplace for several years, such as RR corn and soybeans. RR 
alfalfa is a timely and important case study, as it is the first perennial crop to be approved 
for widespread planting, and is relatively new to the market. To the best of my 
knowledge, there has not been an effort to comprehensively examine the implications of 
introducing RR alfalfa for the organic industry. Using RR alfalfa as a case study in this 
analysis helps to fill this gap in literature. 
 
Given the potential implications of introducing RR alfalfa, chapter three analyzes and 
assesses whether existing regulations are sufficient for protecting the integrity of organic 
alfalfa. Building on arguments laid out in chapters one and two, I flesh out the adequacy 
of the regulatory frameworks using RR alfalfa as a case study. This paper ends with a 
substantial conclusion that discusses the potential role of the judicial system and outlines 
policy recommendations. My hope is that these findings are useful to organic food 
producers, processors, and marketers, as well as non-governmental organizations and 
government officials interested in protecting the integrity of organic alfalfa seed and feed 
sources through advocacy and policy.  
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1. 
 
THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM & COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 
 
The organic food industry wanted to make sure that when people go out 
and see the word ‘organic’ that it has a clear set of standards. . .and we 
know that it clearly cannot include genetically engineered organisms. 25
- Former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman 
 
A Short History of Organic Agriculture Regulation 
 
The national organic standards have received much attention in the agricultural arena, 
and have been the focus of many debates. Even before the new rules were in place, 
genetic engineering was one of the core issues in discussions involving the organic 
standards. Although genetic engineering has provoked countless controversies, few 
solutions to the challenges genetic engineering poses to organic production and 
regulation have surfaced.  
 
Some of the debates around the organic standards focus on whether the organic label is 
accurate, whether consumers are getting what they expect and pay for when purchasing 
organic products.26 Those who do not believe the organic label represents their personal 
ideals lament that a range of ecological, economic, and social concerns are not addressed 
by the NOP.27 For example, recent reports uncover that labor conditions on large-scale 
organic farms are sometimes as bad as conventional operations.28 One consumer 
advocate who pushed Congress to implement the NOP put it this way: “Organic is 
                                                 
25 Food Fight [Electronic version]. (2000, March 7). PBS Online NewsHour, Retrieved on July 12, 2006, 
from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june00/food_3-7.html  
26 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 379. 
27 Guthman, J. (2004). Agrarian Dreams: The Paradox of Organic Farming in California, California: The 
University of California. 
28 Mark, J. (2006, August 2). Workers on organic farms are treated as poorly as their conventional 
counterparts [Electronic version], Grist, Retrieved on August 3, 2006 from 
http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/08/02/mark/  
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becoming what we hoped it would be an alternative to.”29 While an analysis of the 
accuracy of the label in this context is outside the scope of this paper, understanding 
consumers’ perception of the organic label is an essential starting point for any discussion 
on the organic standards, as the consumers of organic products are the driving force of 
the market, whether the label is accurate or not.  
 
It is clear that consumers who purchase organic foods expect these products be free of 
genetically engineered material; therefore, there exists an implied “zero tolerance” for GE 
material in organic products.30 Polls show that the number of consumers who know that 
genetically engineered foods cannot be labeled “organic” under the organic standards is 
growing. In 2002, two polls showed that 68 percent of consumers who bought organics 
agreed they were purchasing products without genetically engineered organisms.31  In 
2003, one of these polls showed that the number had grown to 76 percent.32  
 
Ironically, as this paper will show, GE material continues to turn up in crops and food 
intended for non-GE markets, including organic. Still, little attention has been given to 
the role of regulations in the face of GE contamination. The focus of this chapter is to 
outline the role of the organic standards and Coordinated Framework in keeping GE 
products contained and out of markets where they are not allowed. In chapter three, these 
regulatory issues will be fleshed out using the example of RR alfalfa.  
 
The National Organic Program 
 
In just decades, the organic agriculture industry grew from a grassroots movement into a 
                                                 
29 Pollan, M. (2001, May 13). Behind the organic-industrial complex [Electronic version], The New York 
Times, Retrieved on July 30, 2006, from http://www.mindfully.org/Food/Organic-Industrial-Complex.htm  
30Ronald, P. &  Fouche, B. (2006). Genetic engineering and organic production systems, Retrieved on 
August 12, 2006, from www.indica.ucdavis.edu/publication/reference/r0602.pdf   
31 Carolyn R. & Grobe, D. (2005). Consumer knowledge and perceptions about organic food [Electronic 
version], Journal of Extension, 43(4), Retrieved on October 14, 2005 from 
http://www.joe.org/joe/2005august/rb3.shtml; Whole Foods Market. (2003). One year after USDA organic 
standards are enacted more Americans are consuming organic food [Electronic version]. Retrieved on 
August 14, 2006 from http://www.wholefoods.com/company/pr_10-14-03.html
32 Whole Foods Market. (2003). One year after USDA organic standards are enacted more Americans are 
consuming organic food [Electronic version]. Retrieved on August 14, 2006 from 
http://www.wholefoods.com/company/pr_10-14-03.html
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$14 billion industry.33 As the organic industry grew, many believed that this rapid growth 
warranted uniform production standards at the federal level. On October 21, 2002, the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) implemented the country’s first 
National Organic Program (NOP). The standards were the product of a decade-long effort 
to develop uniform organic production standards, which, in the end, were met with both 
praise and apprehension. Proponents of the new rules celebrated a uniform labeling 
regime after years of confusion in the marketplace regarding what constituted 
“organic.”34 By contrast, opponents of the rules saw the new government label as a 
federal usurpation of the word “organic,” because once the NOP was established, it 
became illegal for anyone to label products as “organic” unless he or she was certified 
under the federal program.  
 
For decades, organic agriculture was regulated by state and private agencies. The 
industry’s growth, however, created confusion in the marketplace, evidence for 
mislabeling, and problems with interstate commerce.35 Members of the organic industry 
began petitioning Congress for federal standards that they hoped would reduce consumer 
confusion over the various state and private labeling rules. Congress responded. Oregon 
Representative Peter DeFazio introduced a bill (H.R. 4165) with the main purpose of 
promoting “the production of organically produced foods through the establishment of a 
national standard production for organically produced products and providing for the 
labeling of organically produced products, and for other purposes”—it had twenty-two 
co-sponsors.36 The staff of Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy ultimately penned the final 
act, the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA), which Congress passed as part of 
the 1990 Farm Bill.37  
                                                 
33 Organic Trade Association. (2006, May 7). Organic sales continue to grow at a steady pace [Electronic 
version], Retrieved on August 12, 2006, from 
http://www.organicnewsroom.com/2006/05/organic_sales_continue_to_grow.html  
34 Nichols, A.J. (2003). As the organic food industry gets its house in order, the time has come for national 
standards for genetically modified foods, 15 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 277.  
35 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 379; (See note 14) 
36 H.R. 4156, Retrieved on June 1, 2006, from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/D?d101:44:./temp/~bdmssF:  
37 Carroll, C. S. (2004). What does organic mean now? Chickens and wild fish are undermining the Organic 
Foods Production Act of 1990, 14 S.J. Agri. L. Rev. 117; Clark, J.B. (1995). Impact and Analysis of the 
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The National Organic Program: Proposed Rule   The Organic Foods Production 
Act (OFPA) authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to create a certification program that 
would meet the Act’s goals. It would be a “comprehensive statutory and regulatory 
framework governing all stages of organic production and handling,” what is now the 
NOP.38  To develop the standards, the Secretary of Agriculture appointed a National 
Organic Standards Board (NOSB), which reviewed existing state, foreign, and private 
organic certification programs. The NOSB was “to assist in the development of standards 
for substances to be used in organic production and to advise the Secretary on any other 
aspects of the implementation of [organic certification].”39 The fifteen NOSB members 
represent several categories in agriculture, including: farmer (4), handler/processor (2), 
retailer (1), consumer/public interest (3), environmentalist (3), scientist (1), and certifying 
agent (1).40  
 
Significantly, the NOSB was not meant to be just another advisory committee. Many 
people were skeptical of the federal government’s ability to draft organic standards that 
reflected the inherent values of organic agriculture. In fact, “the organic community 
agreed to agree to USDA’s primary role in setting organic standards only if the authority 
of USDA was balanced by that of the [NOSB].”41 Thus, the NOSB was to serve as 
USDA’s partnership with the organic community.42
 
When OFPA was passed, 21 states already had existing laws regulating organic product 
labeling.43 By the time the National NOP was fully implemented in 2002, the number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. Federal Organic Food Production Act of 1990 with particular reference to the Great Lakes, 26 U. Tol. 
L. Rev. 323. 
38 Rawson, J. M. (2005). Organic agriculture in the U.S.: Program and policy issues [Electronic version], 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
Retrieved on August 16, 2006, www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57848.pdf  
39 7 U.S.C. 6518 (a),(b) 
40 7 U.S.C. 6518 (b) 
41 Sligh, Michael. 2002. Organics at the crossroads: The past and the future of the organic movement, In 
Kimbrell, A. (Ed.), Fatal harvest: The tragedy of industrial agriculture (p. 343). San Francisco, CA: Island 
Press. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 379. 
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states had grown to 33.44 Existing state regulatory frameworks were more stringent than 
the proposed rule (especially California), and prohibited genetically engineered products 
from products certified as organic.45 Although USDA reviewed California’s and other 
state laws governing organic production, the agency failed to incorporate some of the 
most basic tenets of these regulatory frameworks into its proposed rule. 
 
When the USDA published its proposed rule for the NOP in 1997, the rule allowed for 
the use of many controversial inputs, including genetically engineered (GE) organisms. 
Members of the organic industry, and largely consumers, were outraged by the proposed 
rule. To date, the USDA has never received more comments on a proposed rulemaking 
than it did on its first proposed NOP rule.46 The agency received 275,603 comments in 
opposition of the rule, most of which abhorred the inclusion of GE organisms on the 
National List of Active Synthetic Substances Allowed.47 When asked in an interview 
about the public’s response to the proposed rule, former Secretary of Agriculture Dan 
Glickman replied: “There was an absolute firestorm.”48 Speaking to the more than 
270,000 comments, Glickman said: “It was the most this department has ever received on 
any rule and maybe one of the most the government has received in modern history.”49 
This large consumer outcry showed how important sound organic principles were to the 
public, and that among other controversial practices, genetic engineering held no place in 
the organic movement’s collective vision of what constituted an organic production 
system.  
 
                                                 
44 Carroll, C. S. (2004). What does organic mean now? Chickens and wild fish are undermining the Organic 
Foods Production Act of 1990, 14 S.J. Agri. L. Rev. 117; ( See Note 54). 
45 Howe, K. (1997, December 16). Organic food proposals criticized [Electronic version], San Francisco 
Chronicle, Retrieved on June 3, 2006, from  
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/1997/12/16/BU17287.DTL  
46 65 Fed. Reg. (March 13, 2000); Cummings, Claire. Undermining organic: How the proposed USDA 
organic standards will hurt farmers, consumers, and the environment. Pesticides and You, Vol. 17 No. 4, 
Winter 1997-1998. 
47 65 Fed. Reg., (March 13, 2000). 
48 Lambrecht, B. (1999, June 6). A biotech warrior stresses subtlety [Electronic version], Post-Dispatch 
Washington Bureau, Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
http://www.cnr.berkeley.edu/~steggall/24Apr99-22Jul99.html  
49 Ibid. 
 11
The crux of many of the controversies surrounding the proposed rule was that USDA had 
ignored many of the NOSB’s recommendations, including the Board’s recommendation 
to exclude the “big three,” as they came to be known: genetically engineered organisms, 
sewage sludge, and irradiation.50 In fact, many of the comments “angrily called on the 
agency to obey the NOSB.”51 Today, the USDA continues to be criticized for not 
responding to NOSB recommendations.52
 
Why was USDA permissive of genetic engineering under the organic standards to begin 
with? In an internal memo acquired by Mother Jones magazine, USDA highlights its 
concern about excluding genetically engineered material from organics: “The Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service are concerned that 
our trading partners will point to a USDA organic standard that excludes GMOs as 
evidence of the Department’s concern about the safety of bioengineered commodities.”53 
Still, USDA could not ignore the huge public response it received against the proposed 
rule. 
 
The National Organic Program: The Final Rule  In the end, the final rule better 
reflected consumer and organic industry preferences.54 USDA issued new proposed rules 
on March 13, 2000, which went through another public comment period. The final rule 
was published on December 21, 2000.55 The NOP became effective on February 21, 
2001, but the program itself was not fully implemented until October 21, 2002 (codified 
                                                 
50 NCSA urges Gore to insure ‘strong, credible’ organic rule. (1998, September). ATTRAnews Digest, 
Retrieved on November 20, 2006, from http://www.attra.org/attra-digest/news0998.html  
51Sligh, Michael. 2002. Organics at the crossroads: The past and the future of the organic movement, In 
Kimbrell, A. (Ed.), Fatal harvest: The tragedy of industrial agriculture. San Francisco, CA: Island Press. 
52 Center for Food Safety. (2004). Threats to the National Organic Standards, Retrieved on September 7, 
2006 from http://centerforfoodsafety.org/ProtectingNOS.cfm; Scott, C. (2006, April 26). Organic milk goes 
corporate [Electronic version], Mother Jones, Retrieved on August 3, 2006, from 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/update/2006/04/organic_milk.html  
53 Schmelzer, P. (1998, May). Label loophole: When organic isn’t—organic foods labeling [Electronic 
version], The Progressive, Retrieved on November 3, 2006, from 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1295/is_n5_v62/ai_20527633  
54 Guthman, J. (2004). Agrarian dreams: The paradox of organic farming in California, Berkeley and 
London: University of California Press. 
55 65 Fed. Reg. (December 21, 2000) 
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at 7 C.F.R. 205).56  
 
In a Research Service Report for Congress, it was clearly stated that the NOP’s purpose is 
“to give consumers confidence in the legitimacy of products sold as organic, permit legal 
action against those who use the term fraudulently, increase the supply and variety of 
available organic products, and facilitate international trade in organic products.”57 
Unlike the OFPA, the final rule provided a definition for “organic production,” defining 
it as “a production system that is managed in accordance with the [OFPA] and 
regulations in this part to respond to site-specific conditions by integrating cultural, 
biological, and mechanical practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological 
balance, and conserve biodiversity.”58 (The OFPA only states that “organically 
produced” means an agricultural product that is produced and handled in accordance with 
this title.)59
 
To meet the goals of the OFPA and NOP, USDA accredits private and state certification 
agents to oversee compliance with the rules, largely by monitoring a farmer’s “organic 
system plan.” The “organic system plan” is “a plan of management of an organic 
production or handling operation that has been agreed to by the producer or handler and 
the certifying agent and that includes written plans concerning all aspects of agricultural 
production or handling,” as described in the act and regulations.60 Certified organic 
producers must submit this plan to their certifying agent for the purpose of creating “a 
forum through which the producer or handler and certifying agent collaborate to define, 
on a site-specific basis, how to achieve and document compliance with the requirements 
of certification.”61  
  
Most certifying agents are private. As of August 2006, only nineteen states and counties 
                                                 
56 Rawson, J. M. (2005). Organic agriculture in the U.S.: Program and policy issues [Electronic version], 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
Retrieved on August 16, 2006, www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57848.pdf
57 Ibid. 
58 7 CFR § 205.2 
59 7 U.S.C. 6502(14) 
60 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 
61 65 Fed. Reg. 80,547, 80,558 (December 21, 2000) 
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have established certifying entities. The remaining thirty-six are private companies.62 
These agents visit producers, processors, and handlers to conduct annual reviews of crop 
management practices, handling, and inputs, and to verify continued compliance.63
States are permitted to adopt their own organic labeling requirements with USDA 
approval. State requirements must be as or more stringent than USDA standards and are 
allowed to label their products with a separate logo in addition to the USDA label (as are 
private organic certifying organizations).64  
 
Perhaps the most important aspect to remember about the NOP is that it provides 
production standards only, and does not serve as a certification of the end product.65 In 
the same vein, USDA is clear in pointing out that NOP regulations are not intended to 
address food safety or nutrition. In other words, USDA does not claim that organic foods 
are more nutritious or safer than conventionally produced foods.66 Because the 
regulations are process-based and not product-based (often referred to as the “process-
product distinction”),67 they focus on how a product is grown, harvested and prepared, 
rather than characteristics of the end product. Interestingly, most of the state laws that 
governed organic production before OFPA were not exclusively process-based.68
 
How Does the NOP Address Genetic Engineering? 
 
As mentioned earlier, the final rule does not allow for the use of products derived from 
genetic engineering in certified organic systems. Section 205.105 of the NOP specifically 
                                                 
62 Agricultural Marketing Service. (2006). The National Organic Program: Accredited certifying agents 
[Electronic version], Retrieved August 1, 2006, from 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/NOP/CertifyingAgents/Accredited.html
63 Rawson, J. M. (2005). Organic agriculture in the U.S.: Program and policy issues [Electronic version], 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
Retrieved on August 16, 2006, www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57848.pdf; Baier, A. (2005). 
Organic certification process [Electronic version], Retrieved on May 29, 2006 from 
http://attra.ncat.org/attra-pub/organic_certification.html  
64 7 C.F.R. § 205.620(a),(c). 
65 65 Fed. Reg. 80,549 (December 21, 2000), (“The emphasis and basis of these standards is on process, not 
product.”)  
66 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (December 21, 2000), (“The seal does not convey a message of food safety or more 
nutritional value.”) 
67 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 379. 
68 Ibid. 
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prohibits GE crops from certified organic production systems: “To be sold or labeled as 
‘100 percent organic’ . . . the product must be produced and handled without the use of 
excluded methods. “Excluded methods” are “methods used to genetically modify 
organisms or influence their growth and development by means that are not possible 
under natural conditions or processes and are not considered compatible with organic 
production.”69 Such methods include “cell fusion, microencapsulation and 
macroencapsulation, and recombinant DNA technology (including gene deletion, gene 
doubling, introducing a foreign gene, and changing the positions of genes when achieved 
by recombinant DNA technology).”70   
  
The rules extend the prohibition of GE organisms to animal feed by requiring certified 
organic livestock be fed certified organic feed: “The producer of an organic livestock 
operation must provide livestock with a total feed ration composed of agricultural 
products, including pasture and forage, that are organically produced and, if applicable, 
organically handled.”71  
 
The NOP provides strict certification standards that organic farmers must adhere to in 
order to label their products as “organic.” On the surface it may seem that the NOP 
clearly addresses agricultural biotechnology by not allowing the use of GE seeds and feed 
in certified operations. However, as explained below, GE material can enter a farmer’s 
field and products through means completely out of the farmer’s control, complicating 
the issue of “excluded methods” as they pertain to the NOP. Because genetic engineering 
is listed as an “excluded method,” how do the rules address the unwanted and unintended 
presence of GE material in organic products?   
 
Genetically Engineered Seeds and Crops: Genetic Drift  Organic farmers have 
long been concerned with pesticide drift, where residues of chemicals applied in their 
                                                 
69 7 C.F.R. § 205.2  
70 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 
71 7 C.F.R. §205.237(a)  
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area show up in their organic products.72 Pesticide drift occurs unavoidably with ground 
and aerial methods of pesticide application; in fact, 10 percent to 35 percent of pesticides 
applied with ground application equipment misses the target area, and 50 percent to 75 
percent of pesticides applied with aircraft misses the target area.73  
 
Now, in addition to chemicals transported across field borders, organic producers are 
experiencing a new drift—“genetic drift”—from neighboring fields. The rules define 
“drift” as “the physical movement of prohibited substances from the intended target site 
onto an organic operation or portion thereof.”74 A “prohibited substance” is the use of a 
substance “of which in any aspect of organic production or handling is prohibited or not 
provided for” in the Act or regulations.75 Thus, “prohibited substances” include 
“excluded methods,” including genetically engineered material. 
 
The transfer of genes from GE crops to organic crops poses many problems to organic 
farmers.76 Should a farmer’s crop acquire unwanted GE material, he or she risks losing 
premium prices afforded by organic markets, including organic, as well as export markets 
that shun GE crops and food. Farmers also risk losing the genetic integrity of seeds that 
took years to develop through careful breeding. The issue of liability associated with 
patented genetic traits is of great concern, as companies effectively own crops that 
contain their patented traits, even if those traits entered the crop through inadvertent 
cross-pollinization, as will be discussed at the end of this paper.  
 
While the NOP prohibits the intentional use of GE material in organic systems, the rules 
do not address the unintended presence of GE material—there is no set tolerance for 
                                                 
72 65 Fed. Reg. 80,556 (December 21, 2000) (“Organic operations have always had to worry about the 
potential for drift from neighboring operations, particularly drift of synthetic chemical pesticides.”) 
73 Altieri, M. A. (2005). The myth of coexistence: Why transgenic crops are not compatible with 
agroecologically based systems of production [Electronic version], Bulletin of Science, Technology & 
Society, 25(4), pp. 361-371, Retrieved on May 12, 2006 from 
www.bst.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/25/4/361.pdf  
74 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 
75 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 
76Altieri, M. A. (2005). The myth of coexistence: Why transgenic crops are not compatible with 
agroecologically based systems of production [Electronic version], Bulletin of Science, Technology & 
Society, 25(4), pp. 361-371, Retrieved on May 12, 2006 from 
www.bst.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/25/4/361.pdf
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“contamination” of GE material in organic products.77 Several countries have set 
tolerance levels for GE material in conventional (non-GE) crops and food. These vary 
widely, from the European Union (EU) (0.9 percent) and Japan (5 percent).78 A GE crop 
must be approved in the country in order for any level of tolerance to be acceptable. For 
example, if a GE corn variety not approved for import by the EU is discovered in a large 
shipment of corn that is approved for import, the whole shipment would likely be rejected 
because there is zero tolerance for an unapproved GE product.  
 
The organic rules do, however, establish a tolerance level for pesticide residue. “Residue 
testing” is defined as “an official or validated analytical procedure that detects, identifies, 
and measures the presence of chemical substances, their metabolites, or degradations 
products in or on raw or processed agricultural products.”79 “Tolerance” is “the 
maximum legal level of a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw or processed 
agricultural commodity or processed food.”80 When organic products test for more than 5 
percent residue of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) tolerance for a specific 
contaminant, the agricultural product cannot be sold, labeled or represented as organic.81  
  
Because the regulation does not establish a tolerance or threshold level for GE material in 
organic products, the rules governing the exclusion of products exceeding tolerance 
levels from organic sale do not apply to GE contamination, as it only applies to 
contaminants for which there is an established EPA or FDA tolerance. In the Federal 
Register notice announcing the final rule, USDA explains why a tolerance was not 
established in response to comments regarding setting a “threshold” for GE material in 
organic products: 
We do not believe there is sufficient consensus upon which to establish 
such a standard at this time. Much of the basic, baseline information 
about the prevalence of genetically engineered products in the 
conventional agricultural marketplace that would be necessary to set 
                                                 
77 For purposes of this paper, “contamination” refers to the unwanted presence of GE material in organic 
and conventional crops. 
78 Ronald, P. &  Fouche, B. (2006). Genetic engineering and organic production systems, Retrieved on 
August 12, 2006, from www.indica.ucdavis.edu/publication/reference/r0602.pdf
79 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 
80 7 C.F.R. § 205.2  
81 7 C.F.R. § 205.671 
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such a threshold—e.g., the effects of pollen drift where it may be a 
factor, the extent of mixing at various points throughout the marketing 
chain, the adventitious presence of genetically engineered seed in 
nonengineered seed lots—is still largely unknown. Our understanding of 
how the use of biotechnology in conventional agricultural production 
might affect organic crop production is even less well developed.82
 
This response points to a lack of data regarding the presence of transgenes in organic and 
conventional fields and products. However, as this paper will show, contamination is a 
real threat to many organic producers. USDA’s inaction on the issue proves to be a large 
gap in the NOP, especially when farmers can become contaminated via environmental 
factors completely out of their control. 
 
GE material can enter a farmer’s field through several routes, unlike pesticide drift, 
which is largely attributed to wind. First, transgenic pollen can travel from a neighboring 
farm via wind or pollinating insects (i.e. bees). Second, transgenic and conventional seed 
can get mixed through shared harvesting and storage equipment. Third, volunteer 
plants—crop plants that persist without deliberate cultivation—show up in fields a year 
or more after the original crop was grown as a result of seed being shed from the crop and 
remaining dormant in the soil.83 Some volunteer plants germinate several years after the 
original seed was shed.84  
 
Within a farmer’s “organic system plan” are measures to ensure the genetic integrity of 
the organic product, including the process for locating commercially available, 
organically produced seed.85 Although it is a general rule that producers must use 
organically grown seeds, annual seedlings, and planting stock in their operations,86 there 
                                                 
82 65 Fed. Reg. 80632 (December 21, 2000) 
83 The Royal Society. (1998). Genetically modified plants for food use [Electronic version], Retrieved on 
August 4, 2006, from http://genaction-kr.jinbo.net/archive/roysoc.htm#enviro; Definition of “volunteer 
plant” taken from The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. (2006). Glossary, Retrieved on August 4, 
2006, from www.pewagbiotech.org/resources/glossary    
84 The Royal Society. (1998). Genetically modified plants for food use [Electronic version], Retrieved on 
August 4, 2006, from http://genaction-kr.jinbo.net/archive/roysoc.htm#enviro; (See note 11) 
85 65 Fed. Reg. 80,558 (December 21, 2000) 
86 7 C.F.R. § 205.204(a) 
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are five exceptions to this rule.87 If “an equivalent organically produced variety is not 
commercially available,” a producer may use nonorganically produced, untreated seeds 
and planting stock.88 This exception does not extend to seeds used for edible sprouts, 
such as alfalfa seed used for sprouting. All seeds used for producing edible sprouts under 
the NOP must be organically produced.89 None of the exceptions allow for the use of GE 
seeds. 
 
The plan must also include a description of the management practices that a producer or 
handler will implement to “prevent commingling of organic and nonorganic products on 
a split operation and to prevent contact of organic production and handling operations 
and products with prohibited substances.”90 For example, the NOP requires farms to 
“have distinct, defined boundaries and buffer zones such as runoff diversions to prevent 
the unintended application of a prohibited substance to the crop or contact with a 
prohibited substance applied to adjoining land that is not under organic management.”91 
A “buffer zone” is defined as:  
 
an area located between a certified production operation or portion of a 
production operation and an adjacent land area that is not maintained 
under organic management. A buffer zone must be sufficient in size or 
other features (e.g., windbreaks or a diversion ditch) to prevent the 
possibility of unintended contact by prohibited substances applied to 
adjacent land areas with an area that is part of a certified operation.92
 
Even with guidelines to prevent commingling and drift in place, the regulations do not 
require mandatory testing of products to ensure these measures are successful.93 This 
differs from many of the state laws that governed organic production before OFPA, as 
                                                 
87 For a description of all the exceptions, see Pittman, Harrison M. (2004). A legal guide to the National 
Organic Program [Electronic version], Retrieved on July 2, 2006, from 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/research/#organic   
88 7 C.F.R. § 205.204(a)(1) 
89 7 C.F.R. § 205.204(a)(1)  
90 7 C.F.R. § 205.201(a)(5) 
91 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(c) 
92 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 
93 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 379. 
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many required residue testing.94 The NOP requires certifiers’ on-site inspections to 
verify:  
 
That prohibited substances have not been and are not being applied to the 
operation through means which, at the discretion of the certifying agent, 
may include the collection and testing of soil; water; waste; seeds; plant 
tissue; and plant, animal, and processed products samples. [emphasis 
added]95
 
Therefore, testing for GE material is not mandatory, even when there is reason to believe 
that prohibited substances have entered an organic product:  
 
The Administrator, applicable State organic program’s governing State 
official, or the certifying agent may require preharvest or postharvest 
testing of any agricultural input used or agricultural product to be sold 
[organic] . . . when there is reason to believe that the agricultural input or 
product has come into contact with a prohibited substance or has been 
produced using excluded methods. [emphasis added]96
 
Moreover, testing is unlikely to occur, because: “Such tests must be conducted . . . at the 
official’s or certifying agent’s own expense.” [emphasis added]97  
 
As mentioned above, the NOP does not provide a tolerance level for transgenic material. 
Some comments submitted in response to USDA’s proposed rule argued that without a 
threshold for GE material in organic products the rules set a “zero tolerance” standard for 
contamination.98 Yet USDA states otherwise:  
 
. . .these regulations do not establish a ‘zero tolerance’ standard. As with 
other substances not approved for use in organic production systems, a 
positive detection of a product of excluded methods would trigger an 
investigation by the certifying agent to determine if a violation of organic 
production or handling standards occurred.99
 
                                                 
94 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 379: 6. 
95 7 C.F.R. §205.403(c)(3) 
96 7 C.F.R. § 205.670  
97 7 C.F.R. §205.670(b) 
98 65 Fed. Reg. 80,632 (December 21, 2000) 
99 65 Fed. Reg. 80, 632 (December 21, 2000) 
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If GE material is detected in an organic product, the finding does not automatically point 
to a violation of organic standards, as the standards only govern intentional actions, and 
the “presence of a detectable residue alone does not necessarily indicate use of a product 
of excluded methods that would constitute a violation of the standards.”100 So, not only is 
it unlikely that testing to identify excluded material in organic products will occur, in the 
event that contamination is revealed in an organic product, the regulations do not prohibit 
this product from being sold as organic. 
 
Still, it might be assumed that organic farmers risk losing certification if residues of an 
excluded method turn up in their products. Interestingly, according to a letter from the 
USDA to the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, no farmer has 
ever lost certification due to the presence of GE material in his or her certified organic 
products.101 But it is likely that organic producers will have difficulty selling their crops 
to non-GE markets if GE material is found in their products. They might be forced to sell 
in a conventional market, thus “forfeiting the organic premium price that they would 
otherwise have received for their product.”102
 
As mentioned before, regulations do not specify a threshold level for the unintended 
presence of GE material in an organic product, unlike the tolerance levels set for 
pesticide residue. The regulations do not even mention contamination by transgenic 
pollen or seed. Because there is no requirement to test for the unwanted presence of 
transgenic material, it is highly unlikely that certifiers and/or producers will test products 
under the current rule, especially when testing is conducted at the certifying agent’s or 
farmer’s own expense. Moreover, there is no EPA tolerance level for the products of 
genetic engineering, so “as weak as the USDA production standards are with regard to 
pesticide contamination, they are even weaker with regard to biotech contamination—the 
regulation do not establish any limit whatsoever on contamination by genetically 
                                                 
100 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations, 13 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 379; 65 Fed. Reg. 80548 (December 21, 2000) 
101 Ronald, P. &  Fouche, B. (2006). Genetic engineering and organic production systems, Retrieved on 
August 12, 2006, from www.indica.ucdavis.edu/publication/reference/r0602.pdf; (“The USDA indicated in 
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102 Ibid. 
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engineered materials.”103  This means the regulations allow a product to be sold as 
organic even if contamination is revealed, as long as the producer did not intentionally 
use an excluded method.  
 
Of course, organic foods grown and handled according to the NOP will contain less 
pesticide residue and GE material than their conventional counterparts, because 
producers who adhere to the standards do not intentionally apply pesticides or use GE 
seeds or feed.104 But will consumers tolerate any contamination of their organic food 
products? Do they even know that accidental contamination occurs? 
  
Consumer Perception  
 
The organic food industry continues to grow, and remains an alternative to GE 
ingredients for many consumers. In 2005, organic foods accounted for the largest share of 
the organic industry, with over $13 billion in sales.105 Sales of organic food in the U.S. 
are projected to more than double by 2009.106 The FDA believes that “the practices and 
record keeping that substantiate the ‘certified organic’ statement would be sufficient to 
substantiate a claim that a food was not produced using bioengineering.”107 But GE 
material continues to turn up in crops and food intended for non-GE markets, even when 
the “food was not produced using bioengineering,” as the FDA statement just read. 
Because it is clear that consumers who purchase organic foods expect these products be 
free of GE material, there exists an implied “zero tolerance” for GE material in organic 
                                                 
103 Friedland, M. T. (2005). You call that organic? The USDA’s misleading food regulations [Electronic 
version], 13 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 379. 
104 Consumers Union. (2002). Consumers Union research team shows: Organic foods really do have less 
pesticides [Electronic version], Retrieved on September 4, 2006, from 
http://www.consumersunion.org/food/organicpr.htm  
105 Organic Trade Association. (2006). 2006 manufacturer survey, Retrieved on September 23, 2006, from 
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106 When it pays to buy organic [Electronic version]. (2006, February). Consumer Reports, Retrieved on 
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107 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. (2001, January). 
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products.108 It is unclear whether the organic industry will set a threshold in the future for 
GE material in organic foods.  
 
The organic standards remain controversial, and how they are implemented determines 
their impact on organic integrity, according to Michael Sligh, founding chair of the 
NOSB.109 Even if a tolerance level is established, testing remains a voluntary tool for 
measuring the effectiveness of the NOP. The next chapter reveals a disturbing pattern of 
contamination events that threaten the integrity of the organic industry. Because testing is 
unlikely to occur, the extent of this contamination is largely unknown, making it difficult 
to gauge what a realistic and enforceable tolerance level would be. Furthermore, the 
introduction of RR alfalfa creates new challenges to organic producers, as will be 
explored in the next chapter. The role of the government in regulating GE plants is 
explored next. What responsibility does the federal government and biotechnology 
industry share in keeping GE traits contained? 
 
A Short History of Genetically Engineered Crop Regulation 
 
The regulatory framework for GE crops and food differs tremendously from that 
governing certified organic production. Although GE crops garnered much controversy 
when they were first introduced, and continue to do so today, no new laws were ever 
created to regulate the new technology. Instead, a patchwork of approximately a dozen 
existing laws, and primarily three agencies, governs the testing and introduction of GE 
crops and food. 
 
The framework is outlined below, and includes only those laws and regulations that 
govern GE plants. Segregation and containment issues are discussed at the end of this 
chapter, including assessments by scientists and government officials of their adequacy in 
containing transgenic crops in the environment and marketplace. What we see is a 
                                                 
108 Ronald, P. &  Fouche, B. (2006). Genetic engineering and organic production systems, Retrieved on 
August 12, 2006, from www.indica.ucdavis.edu/publication/reference/r0602.pdf
109 Sligh, Michael. 2002. Organics at the crossroads: The past and the future of the organic movement, In 
Kimbrell, A. (Ed.), Fatal harvest: The tragedy of industrial agriculture (p. 344). San Francisco, CA: Island 
Press.  
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regulatory system largely dependent upon voluntary compliance and risk assessments 
produced by the manufacturers of the products being regulated. 
  
Discussions about risk assessment and regulation of GE organisms began in the 1970s, 
but the federal government did not complete the “Coordinated Framework for Regulation 
of Biotechnology” (hereinafter the “Coordinated Framework”) until 1986, which was 
published by the Office of Science and Technology, and still applies to new agricultural 
biotechnology products today.110 The federal government established a policy to regulate 
products of biotechnology based on composition and intended use rather than by the 
method used to produce them.111 Therefore, the regulatory system for GE crops is 
product-based, unlike the NOP’s process-based approach. 
 
This policy decision was largely based on scientific reports that concluded the risks posed 
by genetically engineered products do not differ in kind from the risks posed by their 
conventional counterparts.112 Specifically, the National Research Council argued 
assessment of risks should be based on the nature of the organism and the environment 
into which it is introduced, not on the method by which it is produced.113 Therefore, a 
central premise of the Coordinated Framework is that the process of genetic engineering 
poses no new unique risks, and should not only be regulated by the same laws as 
conventionally produced products, but that these existing laws are adequate.114 The 
adequacy of the Coordinated Framework has been debated since its inception—from 
those arguing it is not stringent enough, to those arguing that it over-regulates.115
 
Regulatory authority of GE crops and food is primarily given to three federal agencies: 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Environmental Protection Agency 
                                                 
110 Uchtmann, D.L., (2002). Starlink TM—A case study of agricultural biotechnology regulation, 7 Drake 
J. Agric. L. 159. (This article gives an excellent overview of the discussions in around regulating 
biotechnology in the 1970s.) 
111 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986) 
112 National Research Council. (1989). Field testing genetically modified organisms: Framework for 
decision. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
113 Ibid. 
114 The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. (2004). Issues in the regulation of genetically 
engineered plants and animals [Electronic version]. Washington, DC: Author, Retrieved on August 24, 
2006, from  http://pewagbiotech.org/research/regulation/Regulation.pdf  
115 Ibid. 
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(EPA), and Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Below is an overview of these 
agencies’ role in the Coordinated Framework, including the source(s) of their legal 
authority and process for regulating GE plants and GE plant-derived food and feed. As 
will be discussed, some GE products are regulated by more than one agency. Because no 
laws specifically address genetic engineering, and the laws incorporated into the 
Coordinated Framework were enacted for other purposes, they are more general in 
nature.116 Furthermore, these agencies have depended on creative interpretations of their 
roles and authority to develop regulations and guidelines that apply existing laws to 
products derived from genetic engineering.117
 
Table 1 
Major Laws that Give Federal Agencies Power to Regulate Biotechnology 
 
LAWS & REGULATIONS 
 
 
AGENCY 
 
CODIFIED
The Plant Protection Act                                                 
• Gives USDA authority for GE plants, seeds, and other 
GE organisms containing genetic material from plant 
pests, and prohibits unauthorized movement of plant 
pests 
 
 
USDA 
 
 
 
7 C.F.R. 
§340 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act    
• Requires all pesticides sold or distributed in the U.S. to 
be registered by EPA 
 
EPA 
40 C.F.R. 
§§152 and 
174 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act   
• Requires EPA to set pesticide tolerances for all 
pesticides used in or on food 
• Authorizes FDA to regulate “adulterated foods” and 
“food additives,” and to govern food labeling   
 
 
FDA, EPA 
40 C.F.R. 
§§152 and 
174 
(N/A for 
FDA) 
The National Environmental Policy Act   
• Requires all federal agencies to consider the 
consequences of their proposed actions on the human 
environment prior to making decisions, including 
performing Environmental Assessments 
 
USDA, 
EPA, FDA 
40 C.F.R. 
§§1501.3; 
1508.9 
 
                                                 
116 The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. (2004). Issues in the regulation of genetically 
engineered plants and animals [Electronic version]. Washington, DC: Author, Retrieved on August 24, 
2006, from  http://pewagbiotech.org/research/regulation/Regulation.pdf  
117 Bratspies R. M. (2005). Glowing in the dark: How America’s first transgenic animal escaped regulation, 
6 Minn.. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 457. 
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United States Department of Agriculture  
 
Legal Authority The Plant Protection Act (PPA) of 2000 gives USDA authority 
for oversight of GE plants, seeds, and other genetically engineered organisms containing 
genetic material from plant pests.118 The PPA prohibits unauthorized movement of plant 
pests or potential plant pests, including plants derived from genetic engineering.119 
Because the PPA was enacted in 2000, on the surface it “appears to deviate from the 
trend of regulating biotechnology under ancient statutes.”120 However, the new law is 
basically an amalgamation of older statues. The Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) of 1957 
and the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA) of 1912 originally governed USDA’s role in 
agricultural biotechnology, before repeal by the Agricultural Risk Protection Act 
(ARPA), and incorporated into what is now the PPA.121 The FPPA and PQA were 
enacted well before modern biotechnology and were intended to regulate the introduction 
of non-native plant species, not GE organisms.122 USDA developed and still follows 
regulations under the FPPA and PQA to review the agricultural safety of GE 
organisms,123 and has not proposed new or different regulations under the PPA, 
according to the Office of the Inspector General.124  
 
                                                 
118 7 C.F.R. § 340.0 (2)  
119 Plant Protection Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a)  
120 Mandel, G. N. Gaps. (2004). Inexperiences, inconsistencies, and overlaps: Crisis in the regulation of 
genetically modified plants and animals, 45 Wm and Mary L. Re.  
121 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 
122 Mandel, G. N. Gaps. (2004). Inexperiences, inconsistencies, and overlaps: Crisis in the regulation of 
genetically modified plants and animals, 45 Wm and Mary L. Re. 
123 7 U.S.C. § 7758 (repeals former laws and states: “Regulations issued under the authority of a provision 
of law repealed by subsection (a) shall remain in effect until such time as the Secretary issues a regulation 
under section 434 that supersedes the earlier regulation.”) 
124 66 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (October 9, 2001); U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. 
(2005, December). Audit report: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service controls over issuance of 
genetically engineered organism release permits, Retrieved on April 13, 2006, from 
www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf  (“Even if APHIS improves its inspection process, we found 
that APHIS has not updated its regulations to reflect the Plant Protection Act of 2000, under which APHIS 
carries out its biotechnology oversight duties.”) 
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Key Roles and Process for Regulation  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) is the primary entity in USDA that regulates biotechnology.125 Through 
a notification and permit process, APHIS regulates field testing of GE crops in the 
environment, interstate movement, and importation of GE organisms.126 APHIS 
considers each GE plant a “regulated article,” and each DNA segment inserted using 
rDNA methods an “event.”127 Most field trials are conducted under APHIS’ notification 
system, a streamlined process that replaced the permit process for more than 85 percent 
of the crops in field trials, beginning in 1993.128 In 2004, about 97 percent of the plants in 
field trials were regulated under notifications.129 Permits are now only required for plants 
that do not fit the six criteria listed for notifications, such as plants engineered to produce 
pharmaceutical proteins or industrial chemicals.130  
 
Field trials of GE organisms began in 1986, the same year the Coordinated Framework 
was published. Before a person or institution (hereinafter “applicant”) can field test a GE 
organism, they must notify APHIS of the planting (unless a permit is needed). APHIS is 
required to evaluate the notification information and acknowledge within ten days of 
receipt that the planting is “appropriate.”131 Following field tests, applicants can petition 
APHIS to obtain a “nonregulated” status for their product. APHIS evaluates petitions 
submitted by the applicant of the organism being field tested, and after assessing the 
agricultural and environmental safety of the organism, publishes a document explaining 
whether the organism poses a plant pest risk or not, as well as an Environmental 
                                                 
125 Roles of U.S. Agencies. United States regulatory agencies unified website.  Retrieved on September 15, 
2006 from http://usbiotechreg.nbii.gov/roles.asp  
126 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. (2006.) About Biotechnology Regulatory Service, 
Retrieved on September 16, 2006 from http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/about_brs.html  (In 2002, a unit 
within APHIS, the Biotechnology Regulatory Services (BRS), was created to focus on APHIS’ role in 
regulating agricultural biotechnology.) 
127 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (1987) (definition “regulated article”); McHughen, A. (2006). Plant genetic 
engineering and regulation in the United States [Electronic version], Retrieved on September 14, 2006 from 
www.anrcatalog.ucdavis.edu/pdf/8179.pdf (definition “event”)  
128 58 Fed. Reg. 17044-17059 (March 31, 1993) (“Eighty-five percent of current field tests could be 
conducted under the notification procedure.”) 
129 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. (2005, December). Audit report: Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service controls over issuance of genetically engineered organism release 
permits, Retrieved on April 13, 2006, from www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf
130 7 C.F.R. § 340.3  
131 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(e)(4) 
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Assessment (EA) that addresses the potential environmental impact of no longer 
regulating the organism.132   
 
If the petition is approved, the product is no longer regulated by APHIS and can be 
grown for commercial sale. APHIS no longer has oversight over the deregulated crop, 
including requests for new or follow-up testing.133 APHIS reviews approximately 1,000 
field test notifications per year for GE crops.134 Since 1986, USDA has approved over 
10,600 applications for more than 49,300 field sites,135 and has deregulated over 60 
different GE crops.136 The first GE food crop, the Flavr Savr tomato, a variety engineered 
to sustain longer shelf life, entered the marketplace in 1994.137
 
The Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Legal Authority  EPA is charged with the responsibility to regulate the 
manufacture, sale, and use of pesticides to ensure that human health and the environment 
are protected.138 The 1947 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
and the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), both amended most 
recently by the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, give EPA authority to regulate 
pesticides.139 FIFRA requires all pesticides sold or distributed in the U.S. to be registered 
by EPA, and FFDCA requires EPA to set pesticide tolerances for all pesticides used in or 
                                                 
132 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (Petition for determination of nonregulated status); 7 C.F.R. § 372 (National 
Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures) 
133 Tokar, B. (2006, June). Deficiencies in federal regulatory oversight of genetically engineered crops, 
Retrieved on June 1, 2006 from http://environmentalcommons.org/RegulatoryDeficiencies.html  
(www.environmentalcommons.org/RegulatoryDeficiencies.html)    
134 Vines, R. (2002, May). The regulation of biotechnology [Electronic version], Retrieved on October 2, 
2006, from www.ext.vt.edu/pubs/biotech/443-006/443-006.html  
135 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. (2005, December). Audit Report: Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service Controls Over Issuance of Genetically Engineered Organism Release 
Permits, Retrieved on April 13, 2006, from www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf
136 Animal and Health Inspection Service. (2006). Petitions of nonregulated status granted or pending by 
APHIS as of September 2006, Retrieved on September 12, 2006, from 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/not_reg.html
137 The Flavr Savr tomato is now obsolete in the marketplace. Some speculate that it failed in grocery stores 
because it was explicitly labeled as “GE,” while others speculate that the product did not meet consumers’ 
expectations regarding quality.  
138 7 U.S.C. § 136 (a) 
139 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2006). Pesticide Registration Program, Retrieved on September 
10, 2006 from http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/registration.htm
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on food.140 When first enacted, FIFRA was intended to regulate chemical and biological 
substances designed to kill, damage, or repel unwanted organisms, not products derived 
from biotechnology. Although FIFRA has been amended several times, one article points 
out that it was enacted prior to Watson and Crick’s discovery of the DNA molecule.141
 
Key Roles and Process for Regulation  Some plants derived from biotechnology 
are engineered to produce their own pesticides. EPA refers to these plants as “plant 
incorporated protectants.”142 Early on, EPA exempted plants and microorganisms with 
pesticidal properties from FIFRA requirements.143 However, the pesticidal properties of 
the genetic material falls under FIFRA’s definition of a “pesticide.”144 Therefore, EPA 
does not regulate GE plants themselves, only the genetic material inserted into a 
pesticide-producing plant, along with the products it produces.  
 
Examples of pesticide-producing (often called insect-resistant) plants include crops 
engineered to produce a natural-occurring soil bacterium called Bacillus thuringiensis 
(Bt), which creates proteins that are toxic to certain insects, so that the entire plant 
effectively becomes a living insecticide.145 Bt crops are some of the most frequently 
deregulated crop varieties in the United States, including Bt cotton and corn.146
 
Pursuant to the FFDCA, EPA establishes a “tolerance” for the allowable amount of 
pesticide residue on food products.147 All pesticide-producing plants are exempt from 
tolerance level requirements.148  The regulation “eliminates the need to establish a 
                                                 
140 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2006). Pesticide Registration Program, Retrieved on September 
10, 2006 from http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/registration.htm
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144 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772-37,773 (July 19, 2001) 
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maximum permissible level for residues of this plant-pesticides in or on all raw 
agricultural commodities,”149 because “there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will 
result from aggregate exposure to the U.S. population.”150
 
The Food and Drug Administration 
 
Legal Authority  FDA’s statutory authority for regulating genetically engineered 
food stems from the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).151 There are 
no statutory provisions for food derived from genetic engineering, and FDA has never 
promulgated regulations that expressly cover genetically engineered food.152 Coupled 
with FDA’s largely voluntary approach to regulating genetically engineered food, FDA 
arguably practices the least amount of oversight over agricultural biotechnology products. 
 
Key Roles and Process for Regulation  FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety 
and proper labeling of plant-derived foods and feeds, including those that have been 
genetically engineered.153 FDA is authorized under the FFDCA to regulate “adulterated 
foods,” food that “bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may 
render it injurious to health.”154  FDA also regulates “food additives,” which is any 
substance intended to become a component, or affecting the characteristics, of any 
food.155 A “food additive” requires FDA approval unless deemed “generally recognized 
as safe” (GRAS).156 Notably, the manufacturer of a “food additive,” of a GE ingredient, 
makes an “independent determination” as to whether the substance is GRAS.157 
Moreover, manufacturers are not required to report a GRAS determination.158 The FDA 
has never formally “approved” a GE food or feed as safe to eat; it has only determined 
                                                 
149 62 Fed. Reg. 17720 (April 11, 1997)  
150 62 Fed. Reg. 17721 (April 11, 1997)   
151 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399  
152 Mandel, G. N. Gaps. (2004). Inexperiences, inconsistencies, and overlaps: Crisis in the regulation of 
genetically modified plants and animals, 45 Wm and Mary L. Re. 
153 The Food and Drug Administration. Roles of U.S. agencies, Retrieved on September 24, 2006 
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156 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,985 (May 29, 1992) 
157 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22989 (May 29, 1992) 
158 Ibid. 
 30
them to be similar to their conventional counterparts.159 Therefore, FDA has decided that 
most components of food derived from genetic engineering (both the inserted gene into a 
GE plant and the product itself) do not need approval: “In most cases, the substances 
expected to become components of food as a result of genetic modification of a plant will 
be the same as or substantially similar to substances commonly found in food, such as 
proteins, fats and oils, and carbohydrates.”160  
  
Critics of FDA’s policy argue that the differences between a GE food and its 
conventional counterpart have never been defined, and view the concept of “substantial 
equivalence” as being a barrier to research into potential risks of eating GE foods.161 
According to one source, there is but one somewhat official definition of “substantial 
equivalence,” that by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD): “The concept of substantial equivalence embodies the idea that existing 
organisms used as food, or as a source of food, can be used as the basis for comparison 
when assessing the safety of human consumption of a food or food component that has 
been modified or is new.”162 Using this definition, GE food “can be characterized as 
substantially equivalent to its natural antecedent, it can be assumed to pose no new health 
risks and hence to be acceptable for commercial use.”163  
 
FDA also has authority over food labeling,164 but stands by its product-based policy that 
GE foods must only be labeled if they differ “significantly” from their conventional 
counterparts. A change is “significant” when there is an alteration of the nutritional 
                                                 
159 Jaffe, G. (2003, May). Current regulation of biopharming: Is it adequate? [Electronic version] 
Retrieved on October 3, 2006 from www.cspinet.org/biotech/ABAfinal.pdf
160 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22988 (May 29, 1992) 
161 Ho, M.W. and Steinbrecher, R. (1998). Fatal flaws in food safety assessment: Critique of the joint 
FAO/WHO biotechnology and food safety report, Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
http://www.psrast.org/fao96.htm  
162 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. (1993). Safety evaluation of foods derived by 
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content of the food or if a potential allergen is present.165 Because FDA believes GE food 
does not differ from conventional food, labeling of GE foods is not required.166
 
Consumers and food industry players alike have expressed concern about FDA’s 
voluntary approach to regulating genetically engineered food. In response, FDA proposed 
an amendment to its voluntary consultation policy in 2001.167 To date, the new rule has 
not been finalized. Therefore, it is up to the applicant to decide whether to notify FDA 
prior to putting GE foods and animal feeds on the market. Those who do notify FDA 
before a new GE ingredient is placed on the market go through a consultation with the 
agency, after which FDA publishes a memo.168 Although “FDA believes that, to date, all 
developers of bioengineered foods commercially marketed in the United States have 
consulted with the agency prior to marketing the food,”169 developers of a new GE food 
could legally place it on the market without FDA’s knowledge.170 FDA does not require 
mandatory safety testing for GE foods either,171 and has only conducted one safety 
review for a GE food: the first deregulated food product mentioned earlier, the Flavr Savr 
tomato.172
 
The National Environmental Policy Act  
 
All three agencies are subject to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a law 
that requires all federal agencies to consider the consequences of their proposed actions 
                                                 
165 Vines, R. (2002, May). The regulation of biotechnology [Electronic version], Retrieved on October 2, 
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167 66 Fed. Reg. 4706-4738 (January 18, 2001) 
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on the human environment prior to making decisions.173 NEPA provides procedures for 
environmental review, which comes into play for some agency decisions regarding 
agricultural biotechnology, especially the USDA.174 For example, APHIS’ 
Environmental Assessments stem from NEPA process, and are used to determine whether 
a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required.175
 
Segregation and Containment Measures 
  
Segregation  The U.S. currently does not require the segregation of GE crops 
from non-GE crops in the food supply chain, but may propose a system in the future.176 
As will be explained in the following chapter, segregating GE and non-GE crops, 
including organic, has proven extremely difficult, and has proven to be an expensive 
process—both to establish segregation measures and to fix mistakes involving unintended 
mixing of GE and non-GE products. Segregating GE and non-GE products throughout 
the planting, processing, transportation, and exporting stages is a complicated and 
expensive procedure. As illustrated by Dr. Susan Harlander, former vice president of 
Pillsbury Company: a food company can have more than 6,000 products that contain 
8,000 ingredients from 1,000 suppliers that move through 30 processing plants on their 
way to being exported to as many as 100 countries.177 The presence of unapproved 
varieties of GE crops in the food system poses even greater challenges. According to 
some experts, “it may be simply impossible to prevent all mixing and thus ensure the 
regular absence of unapproved transformation events,” especially in the case of crops that 
cross-pollinate.178
 
                                                 
173 42 U.S.C. 4332 
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Containment Efforts to keep GE products segregated from non-GE products begin 
in the field. Institutions that submit notifications to APHIS for field trials are required to 
follow performance standards, including important containment measures for reducing 
the crops’ effect on the environment and surrounding crops. Some of the performance 
standards that must be met for introductions under the notification procedure include:179
 
1. Regulated plants or plant material must be shipped in such a way that the viable 
plant material is unlikely to be disseminated while in transit and must be 
maintained at the destination facility in such a way that there is no release into the 
environment. 
 
2. Regulated plants released into the environment must be planted in such a way that 
they are not inadvertently mixed with non-regulated plant materials of any species 
that are not part of the environmental release. 
 
3. Regulated plants and plant parts must be maintained in such a way that the 
identity of all material is known while it is in use, and the plant parts must be 
contained or devitalized when no longer in use. 
 
4. The field trial must be conducted such that the regulated article will not persist in 
the environment, and no offspring can be produced that could persist in the 
environment. 
 
5. Upon termination of the field test no viable material shall remain which is likely 
to volunteer in subsequent seasons, or volunteers shall be managed to prevent 
persistence in the environment. 
 
As for permits, “conditions” are set for anyone issued a permit to “prevent the 
dissemination and establishment of plant pests.”180 Not surprisingly, many of the 
conditions under permits overlap with the performance standards required for 
notifications; however, permits require more government involvement and stricter 
containment and disposal measures. For example, anyone issued a permit must submit a 
field test report within six months after the termination of the field test, including an 
analysis of all deleterious effects on plants, nontarget organisms, or the environment.181  
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While APHIS gives recommendations on how to meet the performance standards, the 
instructions are very general in nature and may not appropriately address each new GE 
plant, including GE alfalfa.182 They are also not legally binding.183 Ultimately, it is the 
duty of the “applicant” for each regulated planting of genetically engineered plants “to 
determine the specific procedures that will need to be used to meet the performance 
standards and to certify that those standards are being met.”184 Once deregulated, there 
are no restrictions imposed on the commercial planting of herbicide-tolerant plants, and 
further testing cannot be requested. USDA does not have the authority to require farmers 
who plant RR seeds to create refuge or buffer areas to avoid cross-pollination with 
neighbors’ crops or surrounding weeds. 
 
Oversight of Field Trials 
 
Noncompliance with performance standards or permit conditions can involve a variety of 
infractions, including incorrect isolation distances or planting without a current permit.185  
According to APHIS, 76 percent of all potential compliance infractions between 1990 
and 2001 were actual infractions, and only 12 percent were deemed violations and 
referred to APHIS’ Investigative and Enforcement Services unit.186  
 
Although APHIS claims that only two percent of the field tests (in their 1990 – 2001 
investigation) resulted in potential compliance infractions,187 a recent audit report from 
the USDA Office of Inspector General concluded that APHIS’ current regulations, 
policies, and procedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction of 
                                                 
182 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. User's guide for 
introducing genetically engineered plants and microorganisms, Retrieved on October 9, 2006 from 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/usergd.html
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. What is the compliance 
history with APHIS’ biotechnology regulations? Retrieved on October 1, 2006 from 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/compliance9.html
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid.  
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agricultural biotechnology.188 Specifically, the audit found that before APHIS approves 
field trials, it does not review the containment protocols, which explain how the 
notification applicant will contain the GE crop to prevent it from persisting in the 
environment.189 This is especially disconcerting in light of the fact that the vast majority 
of field tests are authorized under the notification process (close to 100 percent). 
Moreover, as the audit reports: 
 
APHIS does not thoroughly document its reviews of applications in the 
official files. Specifically, APHIS biotechnologists do not sufficiently 
document their review process and scientific basis for approving initial 
field test applications. APHIS also does not effectively track information 
required during the field tests, including approved applicants’ progress 
reports, which should contain the results of field tests, including any 
harmful effects on the environment. Although we noted that many permit 
and notification holders submit these required progress reports late or not 
at all, APHIS does not always follow up to obtain the information.190
 
Not only does APHIS “lack basic information about the field test sites it approves and is 
responsible for monitoring, including where and how the crops are being grown, and 
what becomes of them at the end of the field test, the precise locations of all GE field test 
sites planted in the US are not always known.”191 As far as inspections go, APHIS does 
not keep track of the total number of inspections completed, and the audit found that the 
agency “continued to lack an effective, comprehensive management information system 
to account for all inspections and their outcomes.”192   
 
Other reports call for improvement of agency oversight regarding field trials as well. The 
National Research Council concluded that because no single “bioconfinement”193 method 
is likely to be 100 percent effective, developers should create a redundant system by 
                                                 
188 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. (2005, December). Audit report: Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service controls over issuance of genetically engineered organism release 
permits, Retrieved on April 13, 2006, from www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-08-TE.pdf
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid.  
192 Ibid. 
193 “Bioconfinement” is defined by the committee writing the report as a set of biological techniques used 
to prevent transgenic animals, plants, and microbes from escaping into natural ecosystems and breeding, 
thus competing with their wild relatives or passing engineered traits to closely related species. 
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using more than one method of containment.194 The report calls for additional research to 
improve both containment methods and public confidence in regulation.195 In addition, 
the committee determined that methods for detecting and culling GE organisms after they 
escaped “bioconfinement” are limited.196 An earlier report by the National Research 
Council recommends that the process for testing and deregulating GE crops “be made 
significantly more transparent and rigorous” to improve public involvement with policy 
development and decision making, as well as enhance scientific peer review.197
 
Consumers’ Perceptions of Genetic Engineering 
 
Similar to the regulation and marketing of organic products, consumers’ perceptions play 
an important role in the regulation of genetically engineered food. Next to ensuring the 
safety of products, the Coordinated Framework was developed to instill public 
confidence in the regulation of GE crops and food.198 As shown, the system is 
problematic, and, as a result, consumers’ perceptions of GE food are influencing the 
direction of research and development in biotechnology.199 Significantly, they have been 
a primary factor in halting the marketing of several new GE foods.200
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of regulation, Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
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In general, some consumers do not favor the introduction of GE foods,201 and believe that 
laws regulating biotechnology are needed.202 Results from a 2004 Pew Initiative on Food 
and Agriculture poll show that 40 percent of participants said there is “too little” 
regulation of GE food; 47 percent are opposed to introducing GE foods into the U.S. food 
supply; 27 percent believe GE foods are “basically unsafe;” and over 90 percent think GE 
foods should be labeled.203 Polls also indicate that consumers are willing to pay more for 
food that is not genetically engineered. A USDA study showed that in general consumers 
discount GE food “by an average of 14 percent.”204   U.S. consumers are willing to pay 
an extra two to three dollars per pound for beef that is from cattle not fed GE feed. 205 
And other polls show that consumers are willing to pay 5 percent more for non-GE 
potatoes.206  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Retrieved on July 12, 2006, from 
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groups & poll, Retrieved on October 3, 2006, from http://pewagbiotech.org/research/2005update/  
202 Guru, M.  (1999). Attitudes concerning biotechnology, Kerr Center for Sustainable Agriculture, 
Retrieved on August 1, 2006, from www.biotech-info.net/kerr_attitudes.pdf  (60% of respondents agreed 
with this statement.) 
203 Hallman, W. K., Hebden, W. C., Aquino, H.L., Cuite, C.L. & Lang, J.T. (2003). Public perceptions of 
genetically modified foods: A national study of american knowledge and opinion [Electronic version], 
Retrieved on September 29, 2006, from www.foodpolicyinstitute.org/docs/reports/NationalStudy2003.pdf 
(finding that 94% of respondents favor labeling of foods containing GE ingredients); Langer, G. (2001, 
June 19). Behind the label: Many skeptical of bio-engineered food, ABCNews, Retrieved on September 23, 
2006, from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/poll010619.html (finding that 93% of 
respondents favor labeling of foods containing GE ingredients). 
204 Tegene, A., Huffman,W., Rousu, M. &  Shogren, J. (2003, March). The effects of information on 
consumer demand for biotech foods: Evidence from experimental auctions [Electronic version], U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Retrieved on September 24, 2006, from 
www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/tb1903  
205 Lusk, J.L., Roosen, J.,  &  Fox, J. (2003, February). Demand for beef with growth hormones and fed 
genetic corn [Electronic version], American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(1), cited In U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. (2006, April). The first decade of genetically 
engineered crops in the United States [Electronic version], Retrieved on August 23, 2006, from  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EIB11/.  
206 Loureiro, M.L., &  Hine, S. (2002, December). Discovering niche markets: A comparison of consumer 
willingness to pay for local (Colorado grown), organic, and GMO-free products. Journal of Agricultural 
and Applied Economics, 34(3), cited In U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
(2006, April). The first decade of genetically engineered crops in the United States [Electronic version], 
Retrieved on August 23, 2006, from  http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EIB11/. 
 38
Since the introduction of genetically engineered food, several labeling initiatives have 
failed, both at the state and federal level.207 In 2005, however, Alaska became the first 
state to pass legislation specific to labeling genetically engineered food, requiring the 
labeling of genetically engineered fish sold in the state.208 (The FDA is currently 
reviewing a petition for genetically engineered salmon.)209 The most recent push for 
mandatory labeling is the “Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act of 2006” 
(H.R. 5269), introduced by Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich, a long-time proponent 
of mandatory labeling and more rigorous regulation of GE crops and food.210
 
Summary 
 
Unlike organic production, the introduction of GE crops and food in the U.S. came 
without any new statute to regulate these products in the environment and marketplace, 
and address potential environmental and human health risks associated with the new 
technology. Instead, the government continues to rely on a patchwork of existing and 
often outdated statutes, including those governing plant pests, pesticides, and food. 
Experts agree that the mix of rules and laws has proved confusing, and, in particular, do 
not afford proper oversight for environmental risks associated with GE organisms.211 
Specifically, U.S. regulation of agricultural biotechnology research continues to rely 
more on “voluntary reporting and professional norms than on stringent government 
                                                 
207 In 1999, Rep. Dennis Kucinich introduced the Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act of 1999 
(H.R. 3377) to require mandatory labeling of GE food; In 2000, Senator Barbara Boxer introduced similar 
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208 The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, (2006). Legislation tracker 2005, Retrieved on 
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regulation.”212 Regarding consumers, polls consistently show that choice regarding GE 
foods is wanted in the marketplace, and that non-GE foods are growing in demand.  
 
Neither the NOP nor the Coordinated Framework directly address the consequences of 
genetic drift. Specifically, no planting restrictions are placed on growers of deregulated 
GE crops to mitigate gene flow, leaving the burden to protect organic products from 
unwanted transgenic material on the shoulders of organic farmers. Even if containment 
measures are taken, they are not 100 percent effective. As documented by various reports, 
APHIS’ oversight of regulated plants in field trials is not adequate for protecting the 
environment and non-GE crops from the introduction of genetically engineered plants.  
 
In the next chapter, I will apply these frameworks to the case of Roundup Ready alfalfa, 
including a description of the regulatory process that Monsanto and Forage Genetics 
International followed to get the genetically engineered variety deregulated. I will also 
explain some potential implications of introducing this variety into the environment and 
marketplace, paying close attention to important issues identified in this first chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212 Uchtmann, D.L. (2002). Starlink TM—A case study of agricultural biotechnology regulation, 7 Drake J. 
Agric. L. 159. 
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2. 
 
ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA: THE FIRST GENETICALLY ENGINEERED 
PERENNIAL FIELD CROP HITS THE MARKET  
 
Once [Roundup Ready alfalfa] is in the environment, it’s there—it will get 
in everything. Alfalfa as we know it will be gone forever.213
 
- Phillip Geertson, Oregon alfalfa seed producer and lead 
        plaintiff in RR alfalfa lawsuit 
 
 
To fully understand how the Coordinated Framework works it is useful to examine it in 
the context of one particular genetically engineered (GE) crop. Thus, this chapter 
analyzes the case of Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa by first describing the regulatory 
process that Monsanto and Forage Genetics went through to introduce it. Then, I explain 
the potential implications of introducing RR alfalfa, focusing on effects to the organic 
industry. Although some of these implications have been mentioned in public comments 
submitted in response to Monsanto’s petition and a lawsuit against the USDA for 
deregulating RR alfalfa, to the best of my knowledge, there has not been an effort to 
comprehensively examine the implications of introducing RR alfalfa for the organic 
industry.  
 
History of Roundup Ready Alfalfa 
 
RR soybeans entered the market in 1996, followed by RR canola, corn, potatoes, and 
cotton. Although farmers have used glyphosate since the 1970s, RR crops allow farmers 
to apply Roundup (or other glyphosate herbicides) in an unprecedented manner: directly 
over their crops to control certain weeds and unwanted grasses without damaging 
harvests—hence the name, the crops are “ready” for Roundup. 214 As mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
213 P. Geertson, personal communication, April 14, 2006. 
214 Pesticide Action Network. (1996, September). Glyphosate fact sheet [Electronic version], Pesticides 
News, No. 33, Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from http://www.pan-
uk.org/pestnews/actives/glyphosa.htm  
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RR crops continue to be readily adopted, and now claim over 100 million acres across the 
American landscape.215  
 
The most recent RR crop to enter fields is alfalfa, produced by the Monsanto Company in 
partnership with the largest alfalfa seed producer, Forage Genetics International (a 
subsidiary of Land O’Lakes). The events (J101 and J163) used in RR alfalfa are tolerant 
to glyphosate, the active ingredient in Monsanto’s trademark herbicide, Roundup. RR 
alfalfa is the first genetically engineered perennial plant to be commercialized for 
widespread planting in the United States.216  
 
Alfalfa (Medicago sativa L.) is the most important forage crop in the U.S., and is grown 
throughout the nation, covering over 22 million acres in 2006.217 It is the third most 
economically valuable crop to U.S. agriculture.218 Alfalfa is an important animal feed 
because of its high protein and low fiber content, and is a staple of most livestock diets, 
especially dairy cows.219 Because of alfalfa’s pervasiveness throughout the nation, and 
because it is typically grown as a perennial crop, it provides important habitat for 
wildlife, including migratory birds and endangered species.220 For all these reasons, it is 
dubbed the “Queen of Forages.”221
 
Monsanto incorporated the gene sequence (CP4 EPSPS) from a native soil 
microorganism, Agrobacterium, into the alfalfa genome to confer resistance to 
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glyphosate.222 Glyphosate acts on various enzyme systems and inhibits amino acid 
metabolism in what is known as the shikimic acid pathway.223 RR alfalfa plants, on the 
other hand, actually survive glyphosate applications, because the biosynthesis of aromatic 
amino acids is maintained by the continued action of the CP4 EPSPS enzyme in the 
presence of glyphosate.224  
 
Dairy producers will be the likely adopters of RR alfalfa, because they often depend on 
pure alfalfa stands free of weeds and grasses, whereas beef cattle producers and horse 
owners typically feed their animals an alfalfa-grass mixed hay.225 RR alfalfa is not useful 
to mixed stands, as applications of Roundup kill the desired grasses. The majority of U.S. 
alfalfa acreage is planted to pure stands (40 percent), whereas a quarter is planted with 
grasses or another companion crop.226
 
Regulatory Process Leading to the Commercialization of Roundup Ready Alfalfa 
 
The path of RR alfalfa from field trials initiated in 1998 to approval for moving the crop 
into the marketplace in 2005 involved several key steps, reviewed below and summarized 
in Table 2. What we see is a governmental process that posed few serious hurdles along 
the way for Monsanto; yet, one that was also clearly discomforting to many observers of 
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that process, resulting ultimately in a lawsuit challenging many of the government’s 
assumptions and findings. 
 
Field Trials  Under APHIS’ notification program, Monsanto applied for over 300 
glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa field trial permits throughout the U.S. between 1998 and 
2005.227 According to the Information Systems for Biotechnology database, only seven 
of these notifications were either withdrawn or denied.228 The average acreage of these 
field trials was 435 acres.229 It is difficult to determine the total acreage and locations of 
these field trials, because both notifications and permits list the amount of proposed 
acreage for the entire notification or permit, and not the particular states where the trials 
take place. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the amount of acreage proposed for a 
particular state when multiple states are listed under a single notification. Also, according 
to Neil Hoffman, Director of the Regulatory Division for APHIS, the amount of acreage 
proposed usually exceeds the amount planted.230  
 
It is also difficult to determine if Monsanto and Forage Genetics met the performance 
standards outlined in the previous chapter (7 C.F.R. 340.3(c)), as there is no record of RR 
field trial inspections in Monsanto’s petition or APHIS’ Environmental Assessment (EA), 
and little record of the containment protocol used for the field trials.231 The only 
containment measure mentioned in the companies’ petition is the use of different 
equipment for harvesting RR alfalfa from that used for harvesting conventional alfalfa.232 
That said, Forage Genetics did conduct two groups of studies that measured the distance 
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leafcutter and honey bees transfer pollen from RR alfalfa plants to surrounding 
conventional plants.233 These trials were conducted to gain a better understanding of 
alfalfa pollen flow, and to determine suggested isolation standards for minimizing the 
spread of the RR trait in commercial scale plantings.234 Yet there is little evidence that 
isolation distances were implemented for RR alfalfa field trials in general. A sentence in 
the Federal Register notice advising the public of RR alfalfa’s deregulation status 
mentions that field trials “were conducted under conditions of reproductive and physical 
confinement or isolation.” 235  
 
Petition for Deregulation  It took four years for Monsanto and Forage Genetics to 
complete the regulatory process that eventually brought RR alfalfa to the marketplace. In 
2002, the two companies began preparing its petition to APHIS for the deregulation of 
RR alfalfa, beginning with the EPA. Monsanto first submitted glyphosate residue data 
and proposed labeling for the use of Roundup herbicide over the top of RR alfalfa, 
pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).236 
Subsequently, Monsanto submitted a petition for “Reduced Risk” status for review of the 
data, which EPA granted on July 23, 2002.237 The “Reduced Risk” status allows for a 
fast-track review of the use of glyphosate in conjunction with RR alfalfa.238
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On April 17, 2002, EPA issued a notice in the Federal Register that, pursuant to the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), Monsanto had petitioned the agency to 
establish tolerances for glyphosate residues on alfalfa.239  Pursuant to section 408(d) of 
the FFDCA, EPA established a tolerance for residues of glyphosate “in or on animal feed, 
nongrass, group” at 400 parts per million (ppm), and “in or on grass forage, fodder and 
hay, group” at 300 ppm.240 Because these tolerances did not extend to alfalfa seed, 
Monsanto petitioned EPA again to fill this regulatory gap.241 Monsanto further proposed 
to delete the tolerances for alfalfa forage and hay, as the company believed these 
tolerances were no longer needed.242 These tolerances were to apply to both conventional 
and genetically engineered alfalfa.243 Three months later, EPA denied Monsanto’s 
request to eliminate the tolerances for alfalfa forage and alfalfa hay.244 Because EPA 
previously established an exemption for the CP4 EPSPS protein and the genetic material 
necessary for the production of this protein in all raw agricultural commodities, it was 
unnecessary for Monsanto and Forage Genetics to acquire an exemption or tolerance for 
this protein.245   
 
In accordance with FDA’s policy statement concerning the regulation of genetically 
engineered food and feed products,246 Monsanto voluntarily submitted a food and feed 
safety and nutritional assessment summary for events J101 and J163 in October 2003.247 
Although FDA published an overview of the data submitted by Monsanto (discussed 
below), the actual data submitted to FDA is only available to the public through a 
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Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.248 At this time, Monsanto also made 
submissions for regulatory import and production approvals to several countries, 
including Canada, Mexico, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.249  
 
On November 24, 2004, USDA published a notice in the Federal Register announcing 
that Monsanto and Forage Genetics had submitted their petition to deregulate RR alfalfa 
and that APHIS’ preliminary EA was available for public comment.250 The public 
comment period was set to end on January 24, 2005, but was later extended to February 
17, 2005.251  
 
The next month, FDA issued its Biotechnology Consultation Note regarding RR 
alfalfa.252 The Note summarizes Monsanto’s food and feed safety and nutritional 
assessment documents. Because FDA neither conducted independent tests, nor required 
mandatory food safety testing, its opinion on RR alfalfa is based on Monsanto’s own 
determination that Roundup Ready alfalfa is not materially different from conventional 
alfalfa:    
 
Monsanto and Forage Genetics have concluded that their glyphosate-
tolerant alfalfa event J101 and event J163, and the feeds and foods 
derived from them, are not materially different in safety, composition, or 
any other relevant parameter from alfalfa now grown, marketed, and 
consumed. At this time, based on Monsanto’s and Forage Genetics’ 
description of its data and information, the Agency considers this 
consultation on alfalfa event J101 and event J163 to be complete.253
 
                                                 
248 C. Hendrickson, Food and Drug Administration, personal communication, October 10, 2006. 
249 Doll, J. (2005, July 21) Roundup Ready alfalfa approved for use [Electronic version], Wisconsin Crop 
Manager, 12(20), Retrieved on October 6, 2006, from http://ipcm.wisc.edu/wcm/pdfs/2005/05-
20Weeds2.html; (When the petition was filed, imports of Roundup Ready alfalfa products had not been 
approved in any of these countries. Since achieving nonregulated status, Roundup Ready alfalfa has been 
approved in all major export countries.) 
250 69 Fed. Reg. 68300-68301 (November 24, 2004) 
251 70 Fed. Reg. 5601-5602 (February 3, 2005) 
252 Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition/Office of Food Additive Safety. (2004, December 8). 
Biotechnology Consultation Note to the File BNF 000084, Retrieved June 2, 2006, from 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~rdb/bnfm084.html
253 U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2004, December 8). Biotechnology Consultation Note to the File: 
BNF No. 000084, Retrieved June 2, 2006, from http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~rdb/bnfm084.html
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By 2005, it seemed that Monsanto and Forage Genetics had few hurdles left in its path to 
achieving nonregulated status for RR alfalfa. EPA set a tolerance level of 0.5 ppm for 
glyphosate residue on alfalfa seed in February, the final decision the agency would make 
in the approval process.254 Though not mandatory, FDA had reviewed a summary of the 
companies’ data on RR alfalfa’s food and feed characteristics. The petition was still 
pending through APHIS, but evidence pointed toward an approval that year, including 
several articles in agricultural media.255  
 
Thus, people following RR alfalfa’s development were not surprised when USDA 
announced its decision to deregulate RR alfalfa in May 2005, paving the way for the crop 
to move into the marketplace. The requirements pertaining to regulated articles under 7 
C.F.R. 340 no longer applied to the genetically engineered alfalfa variety or its 
progeny.256 APHIS published its Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), which 
concluded that alfalfa events J101 and J163 “would not present a risk of plant pest 
introduction or dissemination,” and that the events “will not harm threatened or 
endangered species or organisms that are beneficial to agriculture; and. . .should not 
reduce the ability to control pests and weeds in alfalfa or other crops.”257 A FONSI 
indicates that the agency does not need to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS).258 Perhaps this is not surprising: there has never been an EIS performed for any of 
                                                 
254 70 Fed. Reg. 7861-7864 (February 16, 2005) 
255 Cline, H. (2004, September 29). Benefits, challenges of Roundup Ready alfalfa examined  [Electronic 
version], Western Farm Press, Retrieved on September 12, 2006 from 
http://westernfarmpress.com/mag/farming_benefits_challenges_rr/; Wilkins, D. (2005, February 11). 
Roundup Ready Alfalfa On The Way [Electronic version], Capital Press Agriculture Weekly, Retrieved on 
September 11, 2006, from 
http://www.capitalpress.info/main.asp?FromHome=1&TypeID=1&SectionID=67&ArticleID=15277&Sub
SectionID=792; Cline, H. (2006, January 11). Growing, marketing herbicide-resistant alfalfa will be 
challenging, worthwhile [Electronic version], Western Farm Press, Retrieved on September 12, 2006, from 
http://westernfarmpress.com/news/1-11-05-herbicide-resistant-alfalfa/  
256 70 Fed. Reg. 36918 (June 27, 2005) 
257 Ibid. 
258 7 C.F.R. 372.5(d); The agency is currently performing an EIS for Roundup Ready creeping bentgrass, a 
popular turfgrass used in golf courses and lawns, produced by Monsanto and the Scotts Company. The EIS 
was prompted by a study that discovered the Roundup Ready bentgrass trait in wild grass species over 
thirteen miles from field trials (Watrud, L. S., et al. (2004). Evidence for landscape-level, pollen-mediated 
geneflow from genetically modified creeping bentgrass with CP4 EPSPS as a marker [Electronic version], 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101(40) 14533-14538, Retrieved on August 2, 2006, 
from www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/101/40/14533.pdf.  
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the GE crops on the market (although one is currently underway for RR creeping 
bentgrass). 
 
Table 2 
 Regulatory Process Leading Up to the Commercialization of Roundup Ready Alfalfa 
May 2, 1998 RR field trials alfalfa begin 
April 17, 2002 EPA issues a notice in the Federal Register that Monsanto had petitioned 
EPA pursuant to the FDCA to establish tolerances for glyphosate residues 
related to alfalfa. 
September 27, 2002 EPA establishes “tolerances for residues of glyphosate in or on animal feed, 
nongrass group; grass, forage, fodder and hay, group and adds potassium salt 
of glyphosate to the tolerance expression.” 
October 2003 Monsanto submits a food and feed safety and nutritional assessment summary 
for events J101 and J163 in October 2003 
August 18, 2004 EPA issues a notice in the Federal Register that Monsanto had petitioned 
EPA pursuant to the FDCA to establish tolerances for residues of glyphosate 
for alfalfa seed. Monsanto also petitions to eliminate the tolerances set for 
alfalfa, forage, and alfalfa hay because they were allegedly no longer needed. 
November 10, 2004 EPA denies Monsanto’s request to eliminate the tolerances for alfalfa forage 
and alfalfa hay. 
November 24, 2004 USDA publishes a notice in the Federal Register announcing the 
Monsanto/Forage Genetic International’s petition to deregulate genetically 
engineered alfalfa and that the Environmental Assessment (EA) is available 
for public comment due by January 24, 2005 
February 3, 2005 Comment period is extended through February 17, 2005 
December 8, 2004 FDA issues a Biotechnology Consultation Note to the File BNF No. 000084 
regarding Glyphosate-tolerant Alfalfa Event J101 and Event J163 
February 16, 2005 EPA sets a tolerance level of 0.5 ppm for alfalfa seed codified at 40 CFR § 
180.364(a) 
May 2005 USDA issues an Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant 
Impact (FONSI) 
June 27, 2005 USDA publishes notice in Federal Register advising the public of its 
determination that glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa events J101 and J163 are no 
longer considered regulated articles. 
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Public Response  By the close of the RR alfalfa comment period, APHIS had 
received a strong response: 663 comments.259 According to the Federal Register, 
comments came from alfalfa growers and seed producers, organic growers, animal 
producers, growers associations, consumer groups, agriculture industries, university 
professionals, and private citizens.260 The vast majority of respondents (520) did not 
support deregulating RR alfalfa, while 137 supported the petition.261 The main concerns 
raised by the opposition included market acceptance and cross-pollination between RR 
and organic alfalfa varieties.262 The concerns, however, went unheeded by APHIS. 
 
After USDA gave Monsanto and Forage Genetics a green light to commercialize RR 
alfalfa, a coalition of alfalfa producers and non-governmental organizations filed a 
lawsuit against the agency on five claims, including violations of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). It is the first lawsuit to be filed against USDA in 
response to the deregulation of a particular GE crop. The plaintiffs argue that RR alfalfa 
will affect the integrity of organic products, creating marketing and liability problems; it 
will introduce more herbicides into the environment and create Roundup-resistant weeds; 
and it will damage export markets. The suit was filed in federal court in the Northern 
District of California, and asks USDA to rescind its decision to deregulate RR alfalfa and 
perform a full EIS. It also asks for an EPA consultation with U.S. Fish and Wildlife about 
the potential for RR alfalfa to affect endangered or threatened species and their 
habitats.263 The case is still pending. 
                                                 
25970 Fed. Reg. 36918 (June 27, 2005); I use the word “strong” here, because compared to other public 
comment periods for the regulation of GE crops and food, 663 comments appears to be a high number of 
respondents. When FDA published its policy statement for regulating biotechnology products in 1984, only 
34 people commented (51 Fed. Reg. 23302, June 26, 1986). In 2006, APHIS received 96 comments in 
response to a petition from the Agricultural Research Service to deregulate a genetically engineered plum 
variety (Though a final decision on the plum has not been published, I tallied the public comments on  
www.regulations.gov) 
260 70 Fed. Reg. 36918 (June 27, 2005) 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Geertson Seed Farms, et al. v. Mike Johanns, et al. 2006 Cal C06-1075 CRB; Plaintiffs include 
Geertson Farms Inc., Trask Family Seeds, Center for Food Safety, Beyond Pesticides, Cornucopia Institute, 
Dakota Resource Council, National Family Farm Coalition, Sierra Club, and Western Organization of 
Resource Councils. 
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Potential Implications of Introducing Roundup Ready Alfalfa into the Marketplace and 
Environment 
 
The lawsuit highlights various problems with the regulatory process involving RR alfalfa, 
but also implications to the organic industry. Since the introduction of RR crops, 
scientists, public interest groups, and farm organizations have raised concerns regarding 
their impact on the environment, human health, and the marketplace. Experience with RR 
soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton show that herbicide-tolerant crops are considerably 
different than their conventional counterparts (despite the regulatory assumption that they 
are not). Indeed, RR crops have posed new agronomic, economic, and environmental 
challenges to U.S. farmers. The introduction of RR alfalfa raises similar concerns as past 
crops, but also new risks emerge because of its perennial nature and ability to cross-
pollinate with crop and weed relatives. These concerns are explored below, including 
herbicide use trends and glyphosate-resistant weeds, contamination and market 
acceptance. 
 
Environmental and Agronomic Concerns 
 
Increased Herbicide Use and Weed Resistance  RR crops have been rapidly 
adopted; for example, in 2006, 89 percent of soybeans planted in the U.S. were an 
herbicide-tolerant variety. Indeed, Roundup use alone has grown by an estimated 700 
percent with the introduction of herbicide-tolerant crops.264 Suggested application rates 
of glyphosate have increased by 50 to 200 percent, largely attributed to the growing 
resistance in weeds.265  
 
                                                 
264 Cline, H. (2005, March 5). Glyphosate resistance new concern [Electronic version], Western Farm 
Press, Retrieved on August 14, 2006, from 
http://westernfarmpress.com/mag/farming_glyphosate_resistance_new/  
265 Benbrook, C. (2004). Genetically engineered crops and pesticide use in the United States: The first nine 
years [Electronic version], Biotech InfoNet, Retrieved on July 1, 2006, from www.biotech-info.net
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Glyphosate-resistant weeds are now the bane of many farmers’ operations, as farmers 
must resort to more toxic and costly chemicals to control resistant weeds.266 Farmers 
must now contend with so-called “superweeds,” a weed that survives a normal dose of a 
chemical application that previously would have killed it.267 Weeds develop resistance 
for several reasons, including: frequent exposure to a particular chemical, the spread of 
naturally resistant weed seeds, and the outcrossing of herbicide-tolerant genes from GE 
plants to weedy relatives.  
 
This issue of increased pesticide use and resistance is obviously of concern for 
conventional farmers, but for organic farmers these issues raise additional concerns, such 
as pesticide drift. An increase in herbicide use is likely to cause more herbicides to enter 
the environment, and spraying causes chemicals to drift, at times fairly far from the 
targeted organism, as mentioned in the last chapter. Additionally, the development of 
weed resistance to particular herbicides, especially glyphosate, has encouraged the use of 
more toxic chemicals to control resistant weeds. 
 
RR alfalfa enters the marketplace at a time when several cases of weed resistance to 
glyphosate have been reported. For example, glyphosate-resistant horseweed (Conyza 
canadensis), or marestail, has infested a half-million acres since it first showed up in 
2003, and may have cost Arkansas farmers as much as $500 million in inputs in 2005.268 
Glyphosate-resistant horseweed has been documented in California, Delaware, Kentucky, 
Indiana and Ohio. Similarly, glyphosate-resistant Palmer amaranth (Amaranthus 
                                                 
266 Gurian-Sherman, D. (2003, December). Roundup Ready wheat: An overview based on advancements in 
the risk assessment of genetically engineered crops [Electronic version], Washington, DC: Center for 
Science in the Public Interest, Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
www.cspinet.org/biotech/RRwheat_paper.pdf  
267 Canon, S. (2001, August 29). Roundup Ready soybeans giving rise to superweeds [Electronic version], 
The Kansas City Star, Retrieved on August 12, 2006, from 
http://www.organicconsumers.org/Monsanto/Roundupsuperweeds.cfm  
268 James, L. (2005, July 21). Resistant weeds could be costly [Electronic version], Delta Farm Press, 
Retrieved on September 1, 2006, from http://deltafarmpress.com/news/050721-resistant-weed/index.html;  
The $500 million figure is based on a 50% loss of yields in a 900,000-acre cotton crop and a 25% yield loss 
in three million-plus acres of soybeans; 
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palmeri), or pigweed, was discovered in Georgia in 2005.269 The weeds survived a 
dosage of glyphosate almost ten times the recommended rate.270 In Missouri, scientists 
have since found glyphosate-resistant pigweed that survives eight times the suggested 
dose of glyphosate.271 Even the most intensive control mechanisms for these weeds seem 
to fail.272
 
These weeds develop in fields where farmers consistently grow RR crops. 273 Therefore, 
introducing another crop into the RR line is likely to further compound these problems of 
weeds’ resistance to glyphosate, and lead to higher input costs for farmers and higher 
chemical concentrations in our environment and food. Furthermore, many farmers who 
produce alfalfa have traditionally used few if any herbicides. Although more recent 
figures are not available, in 1998 a University of Wisconsin weed control specialist 
reported that herbicides are applied to less than 17 percent of U.S. alfalfa hay acreage.274 
Providing the option of spraying herbicides directly over alfalfa is likely to increase the 
amount of chemicals used in alfalfa production. In fact, the National Center for Food and 
                                                 
269 Haire, B. (2005, October 27). Resistant pigweed plagues central Georgia cotton [Electronic version], 
Southeast Farm Press, Retrieved on October 1, 2006, from http://southeastfarmpress.com/news/102705-
Georgia-pigweed/  
270 Wan-Ho, M. & Cummins, J. (2005, March 10). Roundup Ready sudden death, superweeds, allergens 
[Electronic version], Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from http://www.i-sis.org.uk/RRSDSA.php
271 Won, R. (2005, October 17). Study lauds modified crops [Electronic version], Courier-Medill News 
Service, Retrieved on October 12, 2006, from  
http://www.wcfcourier.com/articles/2005/10/17/business/local/d7009b5a666402bd8625709d004cc408.txt  
272 Kendig, A. (2003, December 19). Missouri's pigweed problem increases [Electronic version], Delta 
Farm Press, Retrieved on October 3, 2006, from 
http://deltafarmpress.com/mag/farming_missouris_pigweed_problem/index.html  
273 Glyphosate-resistant waterhemp moves into the corn belt [Electronic version]. (2002, December 12). 
Plant Health Progress, Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
http://www.plantmanagementnetwork.org/pub/php/news/waterhemp/; (“Researchers say the culprit in 
glyphosate resistance and weed shifts is continuous use of glyphosate in Roundup Ready cropping 
systems.”) 
274 Wilke, C.W. (1998, January 1). Roundup Ready alfalfa might benefit corn, too [Electronic version], Hay 
& Forage Grower, Retrieved on August 12, 2006, from 
http://hayandforage.com/mag/farming_roundup_ready_alfalfa_2/index.html; This figure is a result of a 
study entitled Alfalfa: The importance of pesticides and other pest management practices in U.S. alfalfa 
production, a project of the U.S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Pesticide Impact 
Assessment Program, and authored by Arthur A. Hower, Jayson K. Harper, and Gordon R. Harvey.  
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Agriculture Policy estimates that RR alfalfa could result in the application of 200,000 
pounds more herbicides per year in California alone.275  
 
Weed specialists identified weed resistance in RR alfalfa field trials years before the 
variety was approved for commercial sale. A University of California-Davis weed 
specialist observed a shift in the prevalence of a weed in experimental plots where RR 
alfalfa had been grown and sprayed for three years: “When we started this study, there 
were four or five stinging nettle plants on [one] end of the field. . .Now you can see nettle 
all along the field. We’re seeing more and more nettle each year.”276 There is also 
evidence that glyphosate may not kill bermudagrass at the proposed labeled rates for 
weed control in RR alfalfa.277 Additional weeds found in alfalfa stands appear to be 
developing resistance too, including lambsquarter and barnyardgrass.278 Farmers who 
adopt RR alfalfa will rely on additional herbicides whether Roundup-resistant weeds 
surface or not, because Roundup is weak on some of the most important alfalfa weeds, 
including malva, nettle, henbit, cheeseweed, marestail, hairy fleabane and filaree.279
 
At the end of an alfalfa stand’s life (anywhere from three to twelve years), many farmers 
use Roundup to kill remaining plants in order to proceed with crop rotations.280 
Alternatives for taking out RR alfalfa stands are often more toxic than glyphosate 
herbicides, such as 2,4-D and Dicamba.281 According to Cornell University’s 
Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ), a system that rates pesticides’ effect on the 
                                                 
275 National Center for Food and Agriculture Policy. (2002, June). Plant biotechnology: Current and 
potential impact for improving pest management in U.S. agriculture: An analysis of 40 case studies, 
herbicide tolerant alfalfa [Electronic version], Retrieved on July 12, 2006, from 
www.ncfap.org/40CaseStudies.htm
276 University of California studies genetically engineered alfalfa to produce objective information about 
the new agricultural technology [Electronic version], (2004, April 1). Ascribe Higher Education News 
Service, Retrieved on August 1, 2006, from http://ucanr.org/externalstories/alfalfa.shtml
277 Scientists studying roundup resistant strains of alfalfa [Electronic version]. (2004, April 15). Livestock 
Weekly 
278 University of California studies genetically engineered alfalfa to produce objective information about 
the new agricultural technology [Electronic version], (2004, April 1). Ascribe Higher Education News 
Service, Retrieved on August 1, 2006, from http://ucanr.org/externalstories/alfalfa.shtml
279 Cline, H. (2004, September 19). Benefits, challenges of Roundup Ready alfalfa examined [Electronic 
version], Western Farm Press, Retrieved on July 14, 2006, from http://westernfarmpress.com/news/9-29-
04-roundup-ready-alfalfa/  
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
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environment, Dicamba has an EIQ of approximately 28, almost twice that of 
glyphosate.282  
 
Evidence for increased herbicide use and a reliance on more toxic chemicals to control 
resistant weeds points to more chemicals entering the environment and food system. 
Organic farmers have dealt with pesticide drift for decades, and chemical residues 
continue to show up in certified organic products. An increase in herbicide use poses 
another challenge to protecting the integrity of organic products. Coupled with genetic 
drift, it seems that the integrity of organic agriculture is at the whim of the wind. Of 
course, then there are pollinators.  
 
Gene Flow 
 
Alfalfa seed producers rely on pollinators, especially leafcutter and honey bees, to 
pollinate their alfalfa plants in order to yield a large amount of seed. Cross-pollinization 
occurs when bees collect pollen for food, “and in doing they transfer some pollen from 
the flowers of one plant to the flowers of another,” a process “necessary” for setting seed 
in alfalfa.283 When bees transfer pollen from one crop to the next, genetic material is 
sometimes transported as well. Thus, gene flow is a concern for organic farmers who 
need to avoid the presence of transgenes in their crops and products. Both commercial 
and wild pollinators contribute to gene flow in agricultural fields, including to wild 
relatives, such as volunteer alfalfa (seeds that germinate late, often a year or more after 
they are sown) that becomes established on the edges of fields and along roads. Feral RR 
alfalfa plants that are not harvested will go to seed, becoming vehicles for gene flow. 
 
Gene Flow: Crop-to-Wild  Volunteer alfalfa may present serious problems in 
managing unwanted alfalfa plants, including limiting yields of crops succeeding an 
                                                 
282 Kovach, J., Petzoldt, C., Degni, J. & Tette, J. IPM Program. A method to measure the environmental 
impact of pesticides, Cornell University, New York State Agricultural Experiment Station Geneva, New 
York, Retrieved on August 5, 2006, from http://nysipm.cornell.edu/publications/eiq/default.asp; (See Table 
2: EIQ values) 
283 Montana Pest Management Center. (2002, August). Crop profile for alfalfa grown for seed in Montana, 
Retrieved November 3, 2006, from http://www.ipmcenters.org/cropprofiles/docs/mtalfalfaseed.html  
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alfalfa stand.284 All alfalfa has a certain percentage of “hard seed” content. “Hard seeds” 
are viable, but have an impervious seed coat that keeps water from entering the seed to 
start germination.285 Therefore, they germinate late in the season or even years later, 
sometimes leading to volunteer alfalfa plants. These volunteer and feral crop populations 
“can act as potential sources for the reintroduction of transgenes,”286 complicating 
control measures for pollen flow to surrounding alfalfa fields and feral alfalfa. Some RR 
alfalfa field trials averaged 43 to 71 percent hard seed content.287  
 
According to Norman Ellstrand, a leading expert on plant genetics at the University of 
California, Riverside, “some cultivated plants volunteer after cultivation. . . founding 
feral populations that create problems. . .In some cases, the tendency to found feral 
populations could increase as the result of acquiring new traits.”288 That is, transgenic 
crops might evolve into a more aggressive plant.289 Volunteer RR alfalfa will be 
especially problematic when RR alfalfa is rotated with other RR crops, such as RR 
corn.290 County crews also use Roundup to control feral alfalfa along roadsides and in 
ditches.291 If RR alfalfa outcrosses with feral alfalfa, Roundup will be ineffective on feral 
                                                 
284 Altieri, M. A. (2001, March). The ecological impacts of transgenic crops on agroecosystem health, 
Ecosystem Health, 6(1), Retrieved on August 26, 2006, from 
http://www.cnr.berkeley.edu/~agroeco3/the_ecological_impacts.html  
285 Montana State University. (2005, May). Establishing a successful alfalfa crop, Retrieved on October 30, 
2006 from http://www.montana.edu/wwwpb/pubs/mt200504.html  
286 Gulden, R.H., Shirtliffe, S.J., & Thomas, A.G. (2003). Harvest losses canola (brassica napus) cause 
large seedbank inputs. Weed Science, 51: 83-86, cited In Marvier, M. &  Van Acker, R.C. (2005). Can crop 
transgenes be kept on a leash? [Electronic version], Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 3(2): 99–
106, Retrieved on November 13, 2006, from http://www.esajournals.org/esaonline/?request=get-
abstract&issn=1540-9295&volume=003&issue=02&page=0093  
287 Monsanto and Forage Genetics International. (2004, April 16). Petition for Determination of 
Nonregulated Status: Roundup Ready Alfalfa (Medicago sativa L.) Events J101 and J163 [Electronic 
version], Petition # 04-AL-116U, Retrieved on August 2, 2006, from 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/not_reg.html
288 Ellstrand, Norman. (2006). When crop transgenes wander in California, should we worry? [Electronic 
version], California Agriculture, 60(3), Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/anrcs/californiaagriculture/v60/n3/p116/  
289 Ibid. 
290 Vargas, R. (2004, December). Stewardship issues for Roundup Ready alfalfa, A California perspective 
on Roundup Ready alfalfa, Proceedings on California Alfalfa & Forage Symposium, 
San Diego, CA, Retrieved on September 2, 2006, from http://ucanr.org/alf_symp/year.asp  
291 Cline, H. (2004, September 29). Benefits, challenges of Roundup Ready alfalfa examined  [Electronic 
version], Western Farm Press, Retrieved on September 12, 2006 from 
http://westernfarmpress.com/mag/farming_benefits_challenges_rr/; 
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alfalfa plants that have received the tolerance trait from surrounding RR alfalfa plants.292 
Even if the probability of problems due to gene flow in RR alfalfa is low, managing the 
problems can be costly.293 Ellstrand believes that the majority of herbicide-tolerant plants 
are “apt to give a weed a fitness boost in certain environments,” and his studies confirm 
that cultivated plants will hybridize with their wild relatives when grown in close 
proximity.294 A report by the Ecological Society of America concludes, “Currently, it is 
not possible to prevent gene flow between sexually compatible species that inhabit the 
same region because pollen and seeds disperse too easily and too far to make complete 
reproductive confinement practical.”295
 
The case of RR creeping bentgrass may be instructive. A recent study shows that RR 
creeping bentgrass pollen (a popular golf course and lawn turf grass) escaped from field 
trials and hybridized with wild relatives over two miles from the test plot.296 These 
findings follow an earlier EPA study that confirmed RR bentgrass pollen had traveled to 
plants of the same species in different test plots thirteen miles away. As a result of this 
first study, USDA decided to perform the first EIS ever to be conducted on a genetically 
engineered plant. Both the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management fear that 
RR creeping bentgrass will outcross the herbicide tolerant trait to its wild relatives (of 
which there are 23 in the U.S.), precluding the agencies from controlling unwanted 
bentgrass with their current herbicide of choice: glyphosate.297 Additionally, RR creeping 
                                                 
292 Cline, H. (2005, January 15). Resistant alfalfas face challenges [Electronic version], Western Farm 
Press, Retrieved on August 25, 2006, from 
http://westernfarmpress.com/mag/farming_resistant_alfalfas_face/  
293 Ellstrand, Norman. (2006). When crop transgenes wander in California, should we worry? [Electronic 
version], California Agriculture, 60(3), Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/anrcs/californiaagriculture/v60/n3/p116/
294 Ibid. 
295 Snow, A. A., Andow, D.A., Gepts, P., Hallerman, E.M., Power, A.,  Tiedje, J.M. &  Wolfenbarger, L.L. 
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296 Reichman, J.,  Watrud, L.E., Lee, H., Burdick, C., Bollman, M., Storm, M., King, G.,  & Mallory-Smith, 
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297 Smith, Z. (2004, October 11). Biotech companies engineer a ‘superweed’ [Electronic version], High 
Country News, Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
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bentgrass is planted in field trials covering thousands of acres, making the findings 
mentioned above especially alarming.298
 
Gene Flow: Crop-to-crop  Evidence shows that crop-to-crop movement of 
transgenic traits is likely, even more likely than crop-to-wild movement.299 Still, “the 
ecological and evolutionary consequences of crop-to-crop gene flow are just beginning to 
be investigated.”300 What we do know is that “it is easy to lose track of transgenic 
genes,” and as Ellstrand explains: 
 
Different varieties of the same crop are usually fully sexually 
compatible. It is not unusual for adjacent and simultaneously flowering 
fields of the same crop to cross-pollinate. Also, gene flow by seed 
becomes an issue in this context. Unless very carefully segregated, seed 
from different varieties often becomes mixed during seed production. If a 
seed bank persists in the soil, individuals from last year’s planting can 
appear within this year’s crop.301  
 
“Genetic pollution” occurs when transgenic traits make it into crops intended for markets 
that aim to meet a particular level of purity, such as organic crops.302 Unlike the presence 
of a pesticide, a single crop has the opportunity to multiply itself, whereas a chemical 
molecule remains a single molecule or breaks down into metabolites.303 Unwanted genes 
in plants increase their numbers through reproduction, complicating attempts to recall or 
contain the genes.304 If transgene flow is maintained “from a large source population,” 
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the extent these traits spread could be great, including the “potential to persist indefinitely 
in cultivated or free-living populations .”305  
 
Canada’s experience with transgenic canola is an example of how extensive hybridization 
between crops can be. After planting three different varieties of herbicide-tolerant canola, 
Canadian growers now find that canola plants volunteering in subsequent seasons are 
resistant to three herbicides owned by different companies (each of the three herbicides 
for which the different varieties were individually engineered to tolerate, including 
glyphosate). This rampant spread of transgenic canola traits makes controlling volunteer 
canola extremely difficult. It has also negatively impacted markets that shun genetic 
engineering, as nearly 75 percent of Canadian canola is exported each year.306 For 
example, the European Union (EU) export market for Canadian canola was $425 million 
in 1994, but is now “virtually zero” because of the EU’s opposition to GE products, 
according to a report by the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in 
Canada.307 Many also argue that GE canola has destroyed the Canadian organic market. 
As will be shown, the contamination of organic and other non-GE products continues to 
be a problem in an age where two agricultural industries are growing, quite literally, side-
by-side. 
 
Market Concerns & Contamination 
 
Biological factors and human error both contribute to the unwanted spread of transgenic 
pollen and seed. Such contamination is problematic not only ecologically, but also in 
terms of differentiation in the marketplace. Although biotechnology corporations believe 
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“co-existence” is a reality, keeping transgenic and conventional products separate 
throughout the food supply chain has proven more than difficult—some argue it is 
impossible. Many ecologists believe that “strict confinement of [genetically engineered 
organisms] is often impossible after large-scale field releases have occurred.”308 Others 
assert that genetic drift is inevitable. Scientists from Santa Clara University and the 
University of Manitoba recently concluded that the movement of transgenes beyond their 
intended destination is a “virtual certainty.”309
 
As GE crops continue to be readily adopted, contamination events involving organic and 
other non-GE crops ensue. A recent report published by two public interest groups 
documented 88 cases of GE contamination in 39 countries on five continents.310 
Although most of these contamination cases are not fully investigated, cross-pollination 
appears to be a cause in the majority of cases. 311 Not only can GE seeds get mixed with 
non-GE seeds at any stage of production, farmers often unknowingly plant seeds that, 
while not a GE variety, contain GE material—ensuring a contaminated harvest from the 
beginning. The Union of Concerned Scientists tested samples of conventional varieties of 
corn, soybeans, and canola, and concluded that the varieties are pervasively contaminated 
with low levels of DNA sequences derived from GE varieties.312 The report notes that 
foundation seed of traditional crop varieties used for breeding—seeds with no detectable 
level of GE contamination—need protection for future research and market demands.313 
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Even seed industries question whether current foundation seed varieties can meet a one 
percent purity level.314  
 
But seed industries have done little to slow contamination or educate their farming 
customers. For instance, Genetic ID, a GE organism testing facility based in Fairfield, IA, 
tested five different conventional seed varieties from four major seed companies, and 
found that all the varieties of supposedly non-GE seeds from each company tested 
positive for a small percentage of GE material.315 As a result, GE crops continue to turn 
up in fields that farmers believe are completely free of GE crops, and, consequently, in 
markets that do not want GE food, such as organic markets and some export markets.316  
 
Cross-pollination, impure seeds, and the convoluted path seeds travel through—from 
farm fields to grain elevators and transport trucks, to ocean barges and food companies—
are not the only routes to contamination. At times, it is the companies’ own 
mismanagement of genetic resources. In 2004, Syngenta, one of the largest agricultural 
biotechnology companies, reported an error in GE corn breeding to U.S. authorities.317 
For three years, Syngenta inadvertently produced and distributed a GE corn variety that 
did not have regulatory approval.318 As a result, several hundred tons were grown and 
distributed in the U.S., most likely exported to other countries, and used in field trials in 
Spain.319 Syngenta believes that the unapproved corn variety was mistakenly used in 
breeding.320 Similarly, in 2003, University of California-Davis scientists mistakenly sent 
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GE tomato seeds to researchers at twelve institutions in the U.S. and to researchers in 
fourteen countries.321 Apparently, the UC-Davis scientists were unaware the seeds 
contained genes derived from genetic engineering. Seminis Seed, the company UC-Davis 
scientists originally obtained the seeds from, was fined for sending the seeds without 
correct documentation.322  
 
While numerous contamination events have been documented around the world, no event 
has received more public attention than the discovery of Aventis’ StarLink corn in the 
human food supply—a variety not approved for human consumption. In 1999, Iowa 
farmers planted less than 0.4 percent of their corn to StarLink.323 By harvest time, half 
the harvests registered positive for the GE variety.324
 
After this discovery, seed companies, farmers, processors and food makers spent more 
than one billion dollars trying to eradicate Starlink.325 Three years after StarLink was 
found in the food supply and pulled from the market, contaminated grain still pervaded 
the nation’s corn supply.326 In 2003, Aventis agreed to pay $110 million to settle claims 
from corn growers who did not grow StarLink but were hurt by the declining market for 
U.S. corn because of the contamination.327 Neil E. Harl, a professor of economics at Iowa 
State University, estimates that Aventis has paid out more than $500 million to farmers, 
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food processors and grain handlers.328 Experts agree that it will take years to remove 
StarLink from the human food supply.329  
 
Tests Reveal Widespread Contamination in Organic Food Products  As explained 
in chapter one, the National Organic Program (NOP) provides production standards for 
organic crops (and processed products) only, and testing for unwanted genetic material is 
not required for organic crops. Because the government has never required testing, many 
farmers and consumer and environmental groups have investigated the extent of GE 
contamination in conventional seeds.330 For example, StarLink was discovered in the 
food supply after a coalition of non-governmental organizations tested corn taco shells 
for GE material.331 (StarLink corn was the last transgenic crop variety to receive “split 
approval”—approval for animal feed but not human consumption.) Since this finding, 
several contamination events have been revealed across the country.332 Because organic 
farmers depend on organic seed varieties (or conventional varieties if particular organic 
varieties are not available) to meet organic standards and consumer demand, seed 
contamination places an unfair burden on organic producers by hindering their ability to 
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find GE-free seed.333 Some U.S. organic farmers now import seeds from as far as China 
to ensure seed purity.334  
 
Organic grower David Vetter in Nebraska has tested his seeds regularly since 1997, and 
discovered contamination of his corn harvest in 2000.335 Because he confirmed the purity 
of his seeds before planting, Vetter attributes the contamination to cross-pollination with 
GE corn in neighbors’ fields.336 Vetter tests his seeds because seed dealers will not 
guarantee the purity—some refuse to test their seeds. 337 Consequently, farmers shoulder 
the cost of testing if they want to guarantee their crops as GE-free. These tests add about 
25 percent to Vetter's corn seed bill.338 He spent $450 on the tests that revealed the 
contamination of his corn crop and $1,500 to evaluate a load of corn worth $4,000.339 
While he bears the costs, he has little recourse, save going to the court for damages—
something that has not been done by an organic farmer in the U.S. 
 
Illinois-based Clarkson Grain Company takes strict identity preservation measures to 
ensure its crops are non-GE, and uses an optical scanner to sort through conventional and 
organic blue and white corn varieties.340 Despite these precautions, GE material still 
contaminates about six percent of Clarkson’s grain. Clarkson describes GE crops as a 
“leaky technology” and says contamination limits his market, especially abroad, where 
some countries have zero tolerance for GE material in organic products.341
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Most recently, a GE rice variety not approved for commercial use (only approved for 
field trials) showed up in the U.S. rice supply, half of which is exported.342 Fearing the 
same thing could happen to them, India’s lead exporters and farmers unions are asking 
their government to terminate all GE rice field trials in order to protect their markets. 
Rice receives a good price on the export market, and growers fear that countries that 
doubt India’s non-GE status will begin testing or rejecting shipments.343 Research on the 
unapproved herbicide-tolerant rice variety, produced by Bayer CropScience of Germany, 
was abandoned in 2001. Margaret Mellon of the Union of Concerned Scientists says the 
situation offers “more evidence. . .that all of these things that have been getting tested 
ultimately have a route to the food supply.”344
 
Is Organic Alfalfa at Risk? 
 
If RR alfalfa makes its way into the organic alfalfa market, organic alfalfa farmers risk 
serious consequences: costly eradication efforts and potential loss of market; loss of 
consumer confidence and higher prices for consumers; and loss of genetic resources used 
in organic and conventional alfalfa seed breeding. Alfalfa is insect-pollinated, primarily 
by bees; therefore, markets for alfalfa seed and hay that shun or outright reject GE 
material in seeds and feed risk contamination by RR alfalfa. 345 Considering alfalfa’s 
importance to the organic livestock industry, contamination concerns cannot be 
overlooked. 
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Under the NOP, organic livestock must be fed certified organic feed. Milk cows 
accounted for over half of the total number of certified animals in 2003.346 The total 
number of certified organic livestock, including beef cattle, pigs, sheep and lambs, 
increased by 572 percent between 1997 and 2003.347  And the demand for alfalfa-derived 
organic products appears to be growing. For example, in 2005, California experienced a 
shortage in organic feed, and is looking to North Dakota to increase production of 
organic grain and forage, including alfalfa.348 California currently has to import organic 
feed from China and South America to meet its rapidly growing demand for organic 
livestock and poultry markets.349 The U.S. also recently experienced a shortage in 
organic milk, one of the fastest growing segments of the organic market.350 In fact, 
organic milk is one of the first organic products a consumer is likely to purchase, and has 
been called a “gateway to organic food.”351 While the shortage was mostly attributed to a 
lack of certified organic cows, this demand is implicitly coupled with a need for more 
organic alfalfa hay.352    
 
Pollen drift between RR alfalfa and conventional alfalfa was recorded in field trials years 
before the new forage hit the market. Researchers at Kansas State University sstudied 
alfalfa pollen drift and found that complete containment of transgenes within alfalfa seed 
                                                 
346 USDA, Economic Research Service. Data sets: Organic production, Retrieved on October 5, 2006 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/organic/)  
347 Ibid.; Total certified organic livestock equaled 18,513 in 1997, 74,435 in 2003. 
348 California organic farmers looking to North Dakota for feed. (2005, May 10). Valley City Times-Record 
349 Ibid. 
350 Weinraub, J. & Nicholls, W. (2005, June 1). Organic milk supply falls short [Electronic version], 
Washington Post, Retrieved on August 3, 2006, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/05/31/AR2005053100363.html; Klonsky, K. (2000). Forces impacting the 
production of organic foods, Agriculture and Human Values 17: 239. 
351 Severson, K. (2005, November 9). An organic cash cow [Electronic version], The New York Times, 
Retrieved on August 3, 2006, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/dining/09milk.html?ex=1289192400&en=54f6d84cb3f51bcf&ei=508
8&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss  
352 An organic cash cow [Electronic version], The New York Times, Retrieved on August 3, 2006, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/dining/09milk.html?ex=1289192400&en=54f6d84cb3f51bcf&ei=508
8&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; Klonsky, K. (2000). Forces impacting the production of organic foods, 
Agriculture and Human Values 17: 239. (“Obviously, the demand for organic feed will increase along with 
the increase in the supply of organic milk.”) 
 66
or hay production fields would be unlikely using current production practices.353 And a 
market researcher and promoter of RR alfalfa at Washington State University believes 
that it is difficult to certify that non-GE alfalfa will not be contaminated if grown in an 
area where GE alfalfa cultivars are produced.354
 
Even manufacturers and proponents of RR technology acknowledge the unintended 
spread of engineered traits. Monsanto’s 2007 Technology Use Guide outlines factors that 
contribute to cross-pollination but does not require preventative measures for mitigating 
the transfer of the GE trait:  
 
Roundup Ready Alfalfa should be managed for high quality hay/forage 
production including timely cutting to promote high forage quality and to 
prevent seed development. In geographies where conventional common 
alfalfa seed production is intermingled with forage production and the 
agronomic conditions (climate and water/irrigation availability) are such 
that forage alfalfa is allowed to stand and flower late in the season, 
Roundup Ready Alfalfa must be harvested at or before 10 percent bloom 
to minimize potential pollen flow from hay to common alfalfa seed 
production.355
 
Because the NOP does not allow GE material in certified organic farming systems, cross-
pollination of RR alfalfa with organic crops could increase production costs, reduce 
profits, or even eliminate markets for organic alfalfa producers. These markets afford 
organic alfalfa producers a ten to fifty percent premium for their hay compared to non-
organic producers, and are a viable means to making farming profitable.356 USDA does 
not have rules in place that require farmers who plant RR seeds to create refuge or buffer 
areas to avoid cross-pollination with neighbors’ crops or surrounding weeds. As 
explained in chapter one, the burden of keeping “excluded” material out of certified 
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organic fields is on the organic producer, not the neighbor planting GE crops, and not the 
patent owner of the escaped GE trait (in this case, Monsanto). 
 
Still, Monsanto argues that alfalfa hay fields will not significantly contribute to gene 
flow.357 Monsanto spokesperson Mica DeLong said that: 
 
Farmers’ concerns about cross-contamination are unfounded because the 
only way alfalfa can go to seed is if farmers let it, and farmers using 
Monsanto’s Roundup Ready products sign a licensing agreement 
precluding them from saving and replanting the seeds. . .since the 
majority of growers produce Roundup Ready alfalfa only for hay, animal 
feed or exports, growers would not allow their crops to go to seed 
because that would reduce the quality of the forage.358
 
DeLong’s statement is misleading and over-simplified, as alfalfa farmers cannot control 
weather or other factors contributing to their harvest schedule. Just because a farmer 
signs a contract acknowledging recommended growing practices, there is no legal 
requirement for farmers to harvest hay at a certain time, or to ensure that their fields are 
isolated from alfalfa fields grown for seed production (where fields go to full bloom in 
order to set seed). If RR alfalfa becomes well established in the environment and 
marketplace, organic and conventional alfalfa seed may start testing positive for 
transgenic material, as the Union of Concerned Scientists discovered in the conventional 
corn, soybean and canola supply. According to one expert on RR alfalfa, the “most likely 
contamination could be in purchased seed because of seed production practices that may 
not allow adequate isolation distances.”359 Hay producers typically harvest before alfalfa 
blooms or at a very small percentage bloom (extension literature often recommends 10 
percent bloom).360 Opponents of RR alfalfa insist that most alfalfa hay is cut after flowers 
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have already produced viable pollen.361 Therefore, while cross-pollination between hay 
fields is less of a concern than between alfalfa seed production fields, it is nevertheless a 
valid concern for alfalfa producers who want to avoid RR alfalfa.  
 
Of course, pollen does not stop at national borders either. Although RR alfalfa is 
currently approved for import in Canada (not for planting), the company acknowledges 
that cross-pollination can happen across the border. As one Monsanto spokesperson 
explains: 
The company had to take into account the possibility that circumstances 
beyond its control could lead to the GM alfalfa crossing into Canada 
once it was released to growers in the U.S. That could happen through 
illegal shipments of seed into Canada or through insects such as bees 
carrying pollen from Roundup Ready alfalfa fields near the border. 
Cross-pollination with non-GM alfalfa crops could result. It's a plant, so 
we're going to have some possibility for movement.362  
 
Should RR alfalfa in the U.S. contaminate Canadian alfalfa, or if RR alfalfa is approved 
for planting in Canada, sources of non-GE alfalfa seed for U.S. organic alfalfa producers 
may further be limited. Experts agree that more needs to be written about the effects of 
crop-to-crop gene flow, especially in light of recent contamination events.363
 
Export Markets 
 
Even though RR alfalfa is only approved for commercial use in the U.S., it may cause 
controversy in countries that do not share a North American border. Both organic farmers 
and conventional farmers who export (especially to sensitive markets) rely on seeds and 
harvests that are free of transgenic material. Farmers who export to countries that shun 
GE crops and food are just as concerned as organic farmers about their ability to provide 
                                                 
361 Komp, C. (2006, March 3). Farmers sue USDA over modified alfalfa crop [Electronic version], The 
New Standard, Retrieved on September 3, 2006, from 
http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/2883
362 Bell, I. (2004, November 5). Monsanto seeks approval of GM alfalfa [Electronic version], Western 
Producer, Retrieved on October 23, 2006 from 
http://www.agbios.com/main.php?action=ShowNewsItem&id=5999  
363 Ellstrand, Norman. (2006). When crop transgenes wander in California, should we worry? [Electronic 
version], California Agriculture, 60(3), Retrieved on November 1, 2006, from 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/anrcs/californiaagriculture/v60/n3/p116/
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a GE-free product. There was much contention around the introduction of RR alfalfa in 
areas where alfalfa is largely produced for export, because both alfalfa farmers and export 
businesses knew the nature of alfalfa—its ability to cross-pollinate with other varieties—
did not bode well for an industry that depends on foreign customers who are wary of 
accepting GE products.  
 
Nearly all alfalfa exported from the U.S. is grown in the western U.S. Ninety-five percent 
of U.S. alfalfa is kept for use as animal feed; the balance is exported. Japan accounts for 
75 percent of the export market (around $500 million a year), and the rest goes to South 
Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and Canada.364 Even though Monsanto and Forage Genetics 
have received approval from most of these governments, many U.S. export companies 
and producers insist their customers do not want it.365 As one market researcher put it, 
“the issues are more of a concern with the customer than with government approval. 
Most of the alfalfa hay customers have indicated a low tolerance for GMOs in hay 
products.”366  Several alfalfa export companies submitted comments to APHIS in 
opposition to RR alfalfa for this reason.367 The contention around RR alfalfa in the 
context of exports was also documented in the media. Mark Anderson of Anderson Hay 
and Grain Inc., one of the largest hay exporting companies in the U.S., stated that he did 
not want RR alfalfa because of the politics and problems that go with it.368 Jeff Plourd of 
El Toro Export in El Centro, CA is quoted: “Some of our Japanese hay customers are 
asking us to sign documents saying no genetically modified products will be coming 
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worthwhile [Electronic version], Western Farm Press, Retrieved on September 12, 2006, from 
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over.”369 Many alfalfa processors and exporters have indicated that their Japanese 
customers do not want GE material in their forage products.370 So, regardless of any 
tolerance level set by the government (Japan has a 5 percent tolerance for GE material in 
non-GE products), customers may continue to demand zero tolerance for GE alfalfa. 
 
Significantly, the Washington State Hay Growers Association took a strong stance 
against the immediate release of RR alfalfa.371 The Association asked that Monsanto and 
Forage Genetics hold off on selling RR alfalfa in Washington until its foreign customers 
were willing to accept the technology.372 Still, Monsanto and Forage Genetics insisted on 
moving forward with sales in some parts of the state, causing tension between the two 
stakeholders, and increasing fears among exporters that their markets in the Pacific Rim 
would be lost.373 Hay is the largest export commodity by volume in the Pacific 
Northwest, and Columbia Basin growers export about $140 million in alfalfa to Japan 
each year.374 Growers fear that Japanese customers will stop purchasing all U.S. alfalfa 
out of contamination fears, a case similar to the beef embargos imposed by Japan in 2003 
and 2006 in response to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow disease, 
as well as Japan’s response to the prospect of GE wheat, a response that ultimately gave 
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Monsanto little choice but to pull its petition for the deregulation of RR wheat from 
APHIS.375
 
Clearly, the issue of acceptance of GE crops by export markets looms large. When RR 
alfalfa was first deregulated—approved for commercial sales and planting—some of the 
most important export countries had not yet approved the transgenic forage for import. 
Therefore, Monsanto implemented a “Limited Domestic Launch,” which was an 
additional contract that RR alfalfa growers had to sign (in addition to the Technology 
Agreement). Simply put, it stated that RR alfalfa was to be grown for domestic use only, 
pending international market approval. In February 2006, Monsanto and Forage Genetics 
removed the domestic use requirements after receiving final import approval from some 
important export markets.376  
 
Notably, certified organic producers and hay exporters may not be the only ones avoiding 
RR alfalfa. Some “natural” beef producers who prefer non-GE feed are currently unable 
to purchase grain with any guarantee that it does not contain GE traits.377 If RR alfalfa is 
widely adopted, and follows the precedent of RR soybeans, corn, and canola, non-GE 
options will be limited if not impossible to find for farmers and ranchers committed to 
non-GE seed and feed sources.378 Furthermore, in the event of organic alfalfa hay 
shortages, consumers can expect prices of organic meat and dairy products to increase. 
 
Sprout Industry 
 
Consumers may also be concerned about the potential for RR alfalfa to enter another 
market that it is not intended for: sprouts. Alfalfa sprouts are a popular item in health 
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food stores because of their many nutritional benefits.379 Monsanto states in its 2007 
Technology Use Guide that RR alfalfa seed may not be planted for the production of 
sprouts, 380 despite that it has been approved for human food use.381 RR alfalfa seed may 
impact the sprouting industry despite not being marketed directly to sprout growers. This 
is because the introduction of RR alfalfa into the environment and marketplace may 
eventually limit seed sources. Sprout producers who wish to maintain GE-free will find it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to locate pure seed sources in the future should RR 
alfalfa be widely adopted. This is especially alarming for producers who market or are 
considering marketing their sprouts as organic or GE-free. Many large food retail chains, 
including Trader Joe’s, Wild Oats, and Whole Foods, are committed to keeping GE 
ingredients off their shelves. As these markets continue to grow, sprout growers should 
be aware of the difficulty and added costs (testing for transgenic material in their 
products) of providing sprouts that are GE-free. Woodward points out that sprout 
producers, as well as producers who provide alfalfa for natural supplement companies, 
are not likely to know that RR alfalfa is on the market, and may impact their production 
and processing operations. In his words: “It is questionable if the health or sprout market 
knows that an alfalfa GMO will be on the market and that they might have to test for its 
presence.”382  
 
Honey Industry 
 
The honey industry is another stakeholder in the alfalfa industry, as honey bees are an 
important pollinator of alfalfa, and most U.S. honey is produced from an alfalfa or clover 
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floral source. Honey producers risk losing markets that demand honey free of transgenic 
traits. Honey bees can transfer pollen several miles, and could cross-pollinate RR alfalfa 
with conventional varieties. Between 1998 and 2000, honey exported to the EU from 
Canada dropped by five million dollars (55 percent) because of traces of RR canola. At 
the time, transgenic canola was not approved in the EU. It is important to note that 
Monsanto and Forage Genetics are not seeking EU approval for RR alfalfa, meaning that 
any trace of the transgenic forage in food products will be deemed illegal and refused.  
 
Importantly, the NOP does not specifically address certification of honey. In 2004, the 
Policy Development Committee recommended to the NOSB that apiculture operations be 
certified organic and that the NOP “should proceed with rulemaking, using 
recommendations submitted by NOSB to construct proposed rule amendments.”383 These 
rules were recommended because of the unique practices involved in apiculture. Such 
rules are not yet in place, though honey is technically covered by the NOP. There is a 
growing market for certified organic honey, according to a report by the Saskatchewan 
Agriculture, Food, and Rural Revitalization Department. The report also notes that issues 
involving GE organisms “continue to be a concern for many honey producers who export 
to certain markets.”384 Although testing for transgenic material is not mandatory under 
the NOP, countries that import U.S. honey may test products, especially in light of RR 
alfalfa’s introduction, as the EU did years ago with Canadian honey imports. 
 
Summary 
 
Evidence for pollen drift confirms certified organic alfalfa hay and seed producers’ 
concern that containing the RR alfalfa trait may be extremely difficult.385 Of course, this 
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perspective neglects the issue of alfalfa sprouts. Even with demonstrated gene flow 
between alfalfa varieties, proponents do not expect much resistance from consumers, 
because alfalfa is “one step removed” from the food product.386 Still, opponents view RR 
alfalfa’s release as a silent introduction of a new GE ingredient into the food system, and, 
in addition to market risks for farmers, fear negative environmental consequences, such 
as an increase in herbicide use.387 Because GE food, and food derived from GE feed, is 
not labeled in the United States, consumers are left to make the connection from field to 
plate—from those hay bales that dot the rural landscape to their glass of milk, slab of 
butter and cheese, beef steak, honey, and many other livestock products. 
 
It is clear that the introduction of RR alfalfa into the marketplace has caused controversy 
among farmers and consumers alike, and may create similar problems as its RR 
predecessors: an increase in herbicide use and glyphosate-resistant weeds, market 
rejection and cross-contamination. Keeping organic products free of GE material has 
proven difficult, and appears to be a hefty burden for organic producers who struggle to 
ensure the genetic purity of their seeds and harvests. 
 
Organic alfalfa is an important component to the organic livestock industry, an industry 
that continues to grow each year. Evidence for the likely transfer of transgenic alfalfa 
traits into surrounding fields indicates that organic alfalfa producers will face new 
challenges in ensuring organic alfalfa products free of GE material. Export producers are 
also likely to face market challenges, as Japanese customers have already expressed a 
desire for U.S. forage to remain GE-free. The introduction of RR alfalfa may also impact 
the alfalfa sprout market and honey producers seeking non-GE status. 
 
So, are the existing regulatory frameworks with respect to agricultural biotechnology and 
the National Organic Program sufficient for protecting the integrity of organic food in the 
face of genetically engineered crops? Given the potential impacts of introducing RR 
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alfalfa, I will analyze and assess whether existing regulations are sufficient for protecting 
the integrity of organic alfalfa in the next chapter. 
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3. 
 
LIVING TECHNOLOGIES IN AGRICULTURE 
 
They've introduced technology that they can't manage and now I have to 
pay the bills. 
    -David Vetter, Organic Farmer in Nebraska388
 
As examined in the last chapter, there are several potential implications of introducing 
RR alfalfa that make it a good case study for evaluating the effectiveness of current 
regulatory frameworks. Specifically, are they adequate to protect the integrity of organic 
alfalfa in the face of RR alfalfa? Alfalfa is an important component of the organic 
industry, and the demand for organic alfalfa continues to increase each year. The extent 
of the contamination of non-GE feed sources, primarily corn, canola, and soybeans, is 
deeply problematic, and the introduction of RR alfalfa may further limit non-GE seed and 
feed options should conventional varieties become contaminated. Focusing on the issue 
of genetic drift, this chapter points out weaknesses in the National Organic Program 
(NOP) and Coordinated Framework that may allow RR alfalfa to enter the organic 
marketplace, and further evaluates additional issues pertinent to the integrity of organic 
alfalfa products. 
 
The National Organic Program: The Burden of Avoiding a Living Technology 
 
Genetic engineering has been a core issue in organic agriculture discussions for decades; 
yet, as mentioned in chapter one, few solutions to the challenges genetic engineering 
poses to organic production and regulation have surfaced. An obvious weakness of the 
NOP in regards to genetic engineering—to “excluded methods” in general—is the lack of 
mandatory testing of both seeds and harvests. Because USDA’s intentions were to create 
process-based standards, the agency argues that mandatory testing for transgenic material 
in certified organic products would signify a product-based standard.389 Moreover, in the 
event transgenic material is identified USDA goes further to allow the excluded 
substance in organic products as long as the production standards were followed, and the 
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excluded material was not intentionally used: the “presence of a detectable residue alone 
does not necessarily indicate use of a product of excluded methods that would constitute 
a violation of the standards.”390 In response to public comments concerning transgenic 
pollen drift, USDA stated that: 
 
The emphasis and basis of these standards is on process, not product. We 
have specifically structured the provisions relating to excluded methods 
to refer to the use of methods. [Prohibiting] the products of excluded 
methods. . .would not be consistent with this approach to organic 
standards as a process-based system.391  
 
It may not be surprising that USDA discourages testing, as the agency initially rejected 
residue standards in general, even for pesticides on organic foods.392 Although consumers 
tend to demand zero tolerance of transgenic material in organic products, the standards do 
not establish or address a limit for the unintended presence of this material. Interestingly, 
the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) was intended to “require periodic residue 
testing by certifying agents of agricultural products that have been produced on certified 
organic farms and handled through certified organic handling operations,”393 and is not 
exclusively process-based.394 A Senate Report on the Act indicates that Congress may 
have intended for the NOP to monitor the effectiveness of the standards. The report 
explains that farmers “may produce products with minimum residues due to inadvertent 
environmental contamination such as drift from a neighboring farm” even if the organic 
standards are strictly followed.395 The report also notes that organic food is not 
necessarily residue-free, but that “residue testing plays an important role in organic 
certification.”396  
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The Senate Report indicates that testing serves as a check on “the honesty of the system,” 
and a way to ensure that consumers are getting what they pay for: “This legislation 
provides that if prohibited materials are present at levels that are greater than the 
unavoidable residual environmental contamination. . .then such food shall not be labeled 
organically produced.”397 While Congress may have thought the residue testing 
requirement in OFPA would enforce both process standards and product standards, the 
“current NOP regulations serve neither, as the regulations do not require any form of 
random or periodic residue testing.”398
 
The nature of pollen drift makes regulating transgenic material extremely difficult. 
Farmers and certifying agents cannot identify transgenic material that has become 
integrated within a plant without testing. But there are several reasons why testing is 
unlikely to happen. First, certifiers and farmers are unlikely to know if transgenic pollen 
has entered a field and product, unless they are aware of farming neighbors who grow 
transgenic crops that easily cross-pollinate. Second, the regulations read that testing 
“may” occur only if “there is reason to believe” that a farmer has violated his/her plan. 
Third, because certifying agents are hired by farmers, there is competition with other 
certifiers and therefore pressure to keep costs down; meaning, “agents risk losing clients 
to less strict certifiers if they impose burdens on farmers not required by law.”399 Fourth, 
the cost of testing falls on the shoulders of certifying agents (if they request testing) or 
farmers (if they want to investigate the genetic content of seeds or harvests). And people 
in the organic industry may, rightly, feel that it is not their responsibility to test when the 
risks are posed by others. Lastly, there is no real incentive for farmers to test their organic 
products, because these products can still be sold as organic even if they include 
transgenic material, as long as the farmer did not intentionally use transgenic seeds.  
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Contaminated Products are Entering the Market  
 
Because USDA does not require planting restrictions on herbicide-tolerant crops—such 
as isolation distances to mitigate gene flow to non-GE crops—the onus of protecting 
organic plants is on the organic producer. Even with biological barriers in place, organic 
farmers simply cannot control the movement of transgenic material by pollinators and 
wind, and certainly cannot control the genetic content of organic and conventional seed 
that may contain traces of transgenic material without their knowledge. The nature of 
alfalfa lends itself to the argument that RR alfalfa will end up in markets where it is not 
allowed. To review, alfalfa is pollinated by insects, commercially by bees that can carry 
pollen for miles, especially honey bees. Alfalfa is also a perennial crop with a certain 
percentage of “hard seed,” seeds that germinate in succeeding seasons, sometimes a year 
or more later. Controlling 100 percent of volunteer alfalfa resulting from hard seeds, 
especially on a large acreage, is unrealistic, just as unrealistic as the argument that every 
farmer growing RR alfalfa will harvest each plant before viable pollen is formed. For the 
reasons identified in the last chapter, and reviewed above, it is likely that RR alfalfa will 
make its way into the organic market.  
 
A clear pattern of contamination has been documented for many RR crops during the last 
decade. Consumers’ knowledge of this problem is largely unknown, though sources point 
to a limited awareness (or awareness that it is a problem of the future).400 Still, few 
solutions to ensure the integrity of organic products have been identified, perhaps for the 
following reasons. For one, biotechnology companies claim there is a successful “co-
existence” between transgenic and conventional crops (including organic), so efforts to 
continue containment should be minimal. Secondly, both industries arguably depend on 
consumers’ lack of knowledge about transgenic content in organic products. As attorney 
Michelle Friedland points out: 
 
Although it may seem as if the interests of the organic industry and the 
biotech food industry would be entirely in opposition to each other, 
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because the availability of organic food likely reduces political 
opposition to biotech foods, the existence of the organic food industry 
and the public belief that organic foods are free of biotech products 
actually benefits the biotech industry. . .The biotech industry certainly 
does not want to tell consumers that organic food does not actually offer 
a complete alternative to biotech products.401     
 
The organic industry also has an incentive to fuel—or at least ignore—consumer 
misperceptions about organic food, to support the belief that organic is a true (perhaps 
“pure”) alternative to food derived from biotechnology. Thus, the NOP regulations place 
organic farmers in an “awkward position.”402  Because regulations essentially allow 
contaminated products to be sold as organic: 
 
Organic farmers who refuse to knowingly sell contaminated crops, or 
who paid for expensive testing of their crops to ensure that they did not 
do so, would be at a competitive disadvantage to organic farmers who 
merely complied with the NOP regulations’ requirements. Moreover, 
because consumers do not understand that the regulations allow 
contaminated crops to be sold as organic, and because this lack of 
understanding increases demand for organic food, organic farmers also 
have incentive to maintain consumers’ misperceptions about organic 
food.  
 
Nevertheless, many organic farmers are genuinely concerned about the product their 
consumers are receiving, the integrity of organic seeds, and the rampant spread of 
transgenic material.  Some producers frequently test their own products to identify 
contamination, not because it is required by their certifying agent or food processor, but 
because of their efforts to “save organics.”403  
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When contamination is detected, organic producers are left with the burden of eradicating 
the excluded material from their field. In the instance of contamination by RR alfalfa, 
removing all the material will prove to be a difficult task, if not impossible, as seeds can 
lay dormant in the ground until the following growing season (or even later), and 
volunteer alfalfa cannot be readily identified as transgenic. Implementing more stringent 
biological barriers, as well as fronting the cost of testing harvests, will be costly.404
 
The Tolerance Debate 
 
A position paper on co-existence, authored by the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) European Union Group, states that organic 
certification currently has zero tolerance for contamination by genetically engineered 
material.405 Even though consumers of organic products expect this zero tolerance, there 
continues to be a debate around whether a tolerance for transgenic material should be 
established in the U.S. USDA says the NOP does not establish zero tolerance for 
transgenic material, though the rules imply a zero tolerance by including genetic 
engineering as an excluded method. Some seed industries do not favor setting a tolerance 
either. The American Seed Trade Association says that a tolerance of “zero is not 
possible” and is against setting a tolerance for transgenic material in organic products.406 
In countries where tolerance levels are established, such as the EU (0.9 percent), IFOAM 
takes a strong stance on the definition of a tolerance level, asserting that these levels 
“indicate the maximum tolerance for exceptional and unforeseeable contamination 
events, not for permanent levels of contamination.”407  
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The tolerance debate is complex. On one hand, a tolerance level for contamination by 
transgenic material might be a good idea. Curiously, while there is a limit to how much 
pesticide contamination can be in an organic product, there is no allowable limit as to the 
amount of transgenic material that can be present in the event of contamination.408 Before 
the government can set tolerances, however, “it needs to know what kinds of genes are 
present in grain or food.”409 The Union of Concerned Scientists’ Gone to Seed report 
indicates that the government does not have this information; therefore, transgenic 
material from a variety of DNA sequences are possibly making their way into the 
conventional seed supply, but there is no scientific basis on which to determine and 
enforce tolerances.410  
 
On the other hand, consumers depend on certified organic products as an alternative to 
conventionally raised food, many of which now contain transgenic ingredients. 
Supporters of strong organic standards have worked hard to ensure that the organic label 
represents the principles held by the organic movement, including the rejection of 
genetically engineered products. Although “no sector of the food system is trying harder 
to meet consumer demand for choice” than the organic industry, it is clear that 
contamination events continue to threaten the integrity of the organic label.411  
 
Protecting Seed Purity 
 
Seeds are the most fundamental component to agriculture and our food supply.412 Seed 
laws at both the federal and state level do not address the unintended presence of 
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Envtl. L.J. 379. 
409 Union of Concerned Scientists. (2004). Gone to seed: Transgenic contaminants in the traditional seed 
supply [Electronic version], Retrieved on  June 1, 2006, from 
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transgenic material in seed labeled as conventional or organic.413 The NOP only requires 
organic producers to use organically produced seeds (or conventionally produced seed if 
organic is unavailable), and does not require testing of seeds to ensure the absence of 
transgenes. If testing is conducted on seeds, and results show “significant quantities of 
genetically modified DNA. . . even the most comprehensive post-planting controls for 
admixture may fail to preserve the expected premiums for the farmer.”414  
 
Experience with other crops is instructive. For example, in 2002, North Dakota State 
University’s Foundation Seedstocks Program identified transgenic contamination of a 
special variety of soybean marketed to Japan and the EU.415 The following year, 
researchers at the University of Manitoba found that certified seed stocks of canola were 
significantly contaminated by transgenic material, finding that 95 percent of 27 certified 
seed lots were contaminated with transgenic DNA, some with traits that resist two 
different herbicides.416 Fourteen seed lots (52 percent) exceeded the .25 percent 
maximum contamination standard for certified seed.417  
 
Compounding the problem of foundation and certified seed contamination is that seed 
banks used to house collections of seeds essential for broadening the genetic diversity of 
crops are deteriorating due to lack of resources. According to Paul Raeburn, author of 
The Last Harvest: The Genetic Gamble That Threatens to Destroy American Agriculture, 
seeds are the raw materials necessary for securing agricultural security, for improving 
crops in the face of global warming, pollution and other new threats. 418 Therefore, it 
becomes imperative to prevent genetic uniformity and protect the genetic diversity and 
integrity of a variety of seeds, in the field as well as in the seed bank, including the 
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containment of transgenic DNA. According to Farm Verified Organic, an organic 
certification service in North Dakota: “The GM pollution of American commodities is 
now so pervasive, we believe it is not possible for farmers in North America to source 
seed free from it.”419
 
The Coordinated Framework: Regulatory Shortcomings and Insufficient Oversight   
 
Promises were made about containment and segregation, and they weren't 
kept, and you might say they could never be kept.  
 
- Philip Regal, University of Minnesota biologist420
 
Twenty years have passed since the implementation of the Coordinated Framework. As 
mentioned earlier, the laws that make up the framework were created before novel genes 
derived from recombinant DNA technology entered the marketplace, and continue to be 
the focus of controversy as new genetically engineered crops enter the marketplace. Not 
surprisingly, the patchwork approach to regulation has created much confusion among 
the public and regulated industries.421 Some scientists argue that USDA oversight of field 
trials is inadequate, a concern echoed by the Inspector General of Agriculture, and point 
to weak risk assessments as well. Agency jurisdiction over regulating crops is generally 
lacking and weak, lending to activists’ and scientists’ arguments that government 
agencies are biased toward biotechnology firms.   
 
Field Trials & Risk Assessments 
 
Alfalfa is currently among the top ten crops for the most approved field trials, planted in 
at least 35 states.422 (Remember, when a manufacturer submits a notification for a field 
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trial, there is no limit as to the amount of acreage that can be planted, and no limit as to 
how many states one notification may cover.) Pollen drift may have occurred during RR 
alfalfa field trials, and certainly could have entered organic fields during this time, 
depending on where the field trials were conducted. For example, the state of Idaho 
boasts the largest number of certified organic alfalfa hay acres, as well as the second 
greatest number of RR alfalfa field trials (over 40), potentially covering thousands of 
acres.423 Because farmers are not given information regarding experimental field trials 
happening in their communities, RR alfalfa may have entered organic or other 
conventional alfalfa fields unbeknownst to the farmers nearby.424 The recent audit report 
that found APHIS’ current field trial oversight to be inadequate on several fronts, 
including containment of transgenes, lends to the likelihood that RR traits have already 
entered conventional alfalfa fields.425  
 
For notifications (which include RR alfalfa field trials), APHIS simply has to 
“acknowledge” an applicant’s notification for field trials within 30 days, and does not 
perform an Environmental Assessment before the environmental release. Even if 
performance standards are followed, requirements specific to preventing the gene flow 
are not adequate to completely stop the movement of pollen—and APHIS’ 
recommendations for containment are not legally enforceable. Furthermore, APHIS can 
request additional information from applicants, but cannot require the requested 
information be submitted.426  
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Furthermore, scientists criticize risk assessments conducted before commercial releases 
as having “several inherent weaknesses.” 427 For example, the smaller scale of field 
studies might not represent large-scale commercial production. As noted in an Ecological 
Society of America study, “pre-commercial field studies are not likely to include the 
large amount of replication needed to identify small but important effects.”428 Scientists 
claim that monitoring a GE crop after it is commercialized is crucial for identifying any 
unintended effects, yet once deregulated, a commercialized GE crop is completely 
removed from USDA’s oversight, including follow-up tests.429 A 2002 National 
Academy of Sciences report found that: “There has been no environmental monitoring of 
these transgenic crops, so any effects that might have occurred could not have been 
detected. The absence of evidence of an effect is not evidence of absence of an effect.”430  
 
Even if more stringent containment measures are implemented, there are no rules in place 
requiring growers of RR alfalfa to adhere to them. As noted by University of California 
Extension Farm Advisor, Shannon Mueller, “Although standards can be revised to 
modify isolation and control pollination, movement of pollen beyond the borders of an 
individual field cannot be prevented entirely.”431  
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Agency & Industry Oversight  
 
Compounding the fact that RR alfalfa cross-pollinates with other varieties is the reality 
that farmers who plant RR alfalfa for hay are not bound to any planting restrictions, 
including containment measures. Instead, growers who plant RR alfalfa enter into 
Monsanto’s “Technology/Stewardship Agreements” that acknowledge RR alfalfa is 
capable of moving across field borders, but does not require growers to implement 
containment strategies in their operations. Even if farmers are careful to harvest their RR 
alfalfa hay before pollen is produced, ensuring this is impossible, and there is likely to be 
some gene flow, especially in absence of biological barriers. All of these measures are 
dependent on farmers’ oversight, and therefore allows for human error.432 Even if a 
buffer area or isolation distance for mitigating the spread of RR alfalfa pollen is 
established, 100 percent containment is not possible, especially using one method of 
containment. 433  
 
Another inherent weakness of the Coordinated Framework is that it is not proactive. As 
shown in the Starlink case, regulatory action is usually taken in response to events of 
contamination.434 The Coordinated Framework is based on the assumption that transgenic 
crops behave the same way as conventional crops.435 Yet, not only do several sources 
point to a need for improvement in how genetically engineered crops are regulated in the 
U.S., historical contamination events prove that 1) containment is extremely difficult, and 
2) contamination events, if uncovered, are costly.436 Moreover, contamination events are 
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extremely difficult to fix, and may compromise organic and other conventional field 
operations for years. This creates a dangerous scenario in light of potential human health 
and ecological impacts. For example, should evidence surface that RR alfalfa is making 
its way into alfalfa seed operations marketed to edible sprout producers, or that cows are 
developing health problems from eating RR alfalfa hay, recalling a living technology 
from the environment and removing products from a convoluted food system will likely 
be a difficult, expensive, and lengthy process, as was seen with the StarLink case.437
 
Agency Priorities  
 
USDA may have a stronger interest in protecting the interests of large biotechnology 
companies than they do in organic producers. The National Research Council concluded 
that APHIS’ risk assessments may be biased toward a finding of no significant impact, 
which means an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will not be triggered.438 In the 
case of RR alfalfa, APHIS has been criticized by plaintiffs in the lawsuit challenging the 
agency’s decision on RR alfalfa for not addressing the issue of organic contamination in 
its Environmental Assessment, including the potential socio-economic impacts.439 
Similarly, the National Research Council speaks to this lack of attention to other farming 
systems: “Currently, APHIS environmental assessments focus on the simplest ecological 
scale. . .APHIS should include any impact on regional farming practice or systems in its 
deregulation assessments.”440
 
USDA also has a history of a “revolving door,” a label given to situations where 
employees who work for the government sometimes regulate industries that they once 
worked for or managed.441 For example, Neil Hoffman, the Director of Biotechnology 
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Regulatory Services in USDA once worked for a biotechnology company called 
Paradigm Genetics, Inc. (now Icoria, Inc.), a firm that collaborated with Monsanto on 
biotechnology projects. In 2005, the firm sold its Agricultural Genomics Assets to 
Monsanto for over six million dollars.442 The press release for this sale highlights the 
conflict-of-interest for Mr. Hoffman, whose responsibility is to oversee APHIS’ 
biotechnology deregulation process for transgenic traits: “The acquired assets are related 
to the field of transgenic traits for agriculture, which has been the focus of research 
conducted under an existing six-year, $55-million agreement signed in 1999 between 
Monsanto and Icoria, formerly Paradigm Genetics.” 443 Hoffman joined Paradigm 
Genetics, Inc. in 1999, the same year the $55 million agreement was signed with 
Monsanto.444
 
Furthermore, of all the funds USDA allocates to biotechnology research, only one percent 
goes toward risk assessment—about $1-2 million per year.445 Given the current amount 
of transgenic crop acreage—both field trials and commercial cultivation—these resources 
are insufficient to even discover the “tip of the iceberg.”446 Such funding seems 
necessary if agencies continue to heavily rely on manufacturers’ own studies when 
determining deregulation status of transgenic crops. 
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Summary  
 
Both the NOP and Coordinated Framework fail to address issues concerning the nature of 
introducing RR alfalfa. Alfalfa is a perennial forage crop, meaning it remains in the 
ground for more than one year (anywhere from three to twelve years). Because alfalfa is 
insect-pollinated, transgenic traits will travel from field-to-field even with isolation 
distances or biological barriers in place. Evidence for pollen flow shows that bees can 
carry transgenic pollen for miles, making containment measures largely ineffective for 
keeping RR alfalfa pollen within planting borders. No containment strategy is 100 
percent effective, due to environmental factors and human error. Moreover, without 
frequent testing of organic products, we will never learn the extent of the problem, 
including whether organic alfalfa becomes contaminated by RR alfalfa. Regardless of any 
measure taken to protect organic products from transgenic contamination, the burden of 
protecting organic plants from transgenic pollen drift continues to be on the shoulders of 
organic farmers.  
 
We know that the organic market is growing, especially the market for organic alfalfa 
hay, due to the expansion of organic livestock production. Neither the NOP and 
Coordinated Framework go far enough to ensure that organic alfalfa will be protected in 
the face of genetically engineered alfalfa. Though contamination of organic alfalfa could 
have occurred in field trials, it is even more likely to occur now that RR alfalfa is 
available for commercial production and is not bound to further oversight by APHIS, 
including restrictions on planting.  
 
And what about consumer confidence? After all, this is what drives market demand, 
especially organic (since these foods are labeled). The outpouring of public comment in 
response to the proposed NOP rules, and the way the organic industry united to preserve 
the integrity of their products, show support for strong organic standards, including the 
omission of products derived from genetic engineering. As these two industries grow, the 
inability to keep GE material out of conventional seed varieties will continue to reduce 
the integrity of organic food products, and makes it unrealistic for consumers to expect a 
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guarantee that all organic foods are free of GE material. If consumers purchasing organic 
products to avoid genetically engineered ingredients learn that it is not uncommon for 
transgenic material to make its way into organic products, it may be hard for them to trust 
the label. 
  
Can the two industries co-exist? That is, can transgenic crops and conventional (including 
organic) be grown with little or no impact to the other? The advantages of concealing 
contamination to both the organic and biotechnology industry is curious. Strictly 
speaking from an economic perspective, fueling consumers’ belief that organic products 
do not contain any transgenic material ensures two things. First, that organic products 
deserve a premium price for being “pure”—that consumers are paying for a product that 
meets their expectations. Second, that biotechnology companies can point to a complete 
alternative to their own products, asserting that consumers do have a choice whether to 
eat transgenic ingredients or not.    
 
If the purpose of the NOP is to give consumers confidence in the legitimacy of products 
sold as organic and to increase the supply and variety of available organic products, as 
well as facilitate international trade in organic products,447 then contamination of organic 
products weakens all of these purposes: it lessens consumer confidence in the legitimacy 
of products, and decreases the supply and variety of available organic products both for 
domestic use and international trade. It appears that a large sector of the organic industry 
will continue to push for more stringent containment of genetically engineered products. 
It is what the consumers of organic products want, and it is what organic producers need 
to—perhaps not meet the standards as they currently are written—but to fulfill the values 
they see as inherent within organic agriculture. The principle of rejecting transgenic 
material in organic agriculture systems will become moot if avoiding this technology 
becomes impossible.      
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CONCLUSION 
 
INTEGRITY IN THE ORGANIC MARKETPLACE 
 
Our challenge is to develop practical strategies for promoting and 
preserving organic integrity. We will be evaluated and judged on what 
organics becomes as well as what we choose to leave out. It is up to all of 
us. We must not become what we set out to be the sane alternative to. 
 
- Michael Sligh, founding chair, National Organic Standards Board448
 
 
The organic and biotechnology industries have enjoyed enormous growth in the last 
decade. They also have had their share of controversies; yet, continue to expand their 
presence in the field and the marketplace. As they do, it becomes clear that their products 
cannot remain separate, that “co-existence” is not possible, because genetically 
engineered crops are essentially living technologies. They do not belong and are not 
allowed in organic fields and products, but continue to show up there, becoming a burden 
that some organic producers pay to avoid and sometimes eradicate.  
 
This paper looked at two regulatory frameworks important to U.S. agriculture: The 
National Organic Program (NOP) and Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology. Using Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa as a case study was useful in 
understanding the role of these laws and regulations, but also helped to illustrate a larger 
problem with the existing frameworks. Although both industries acknowledge that 
transgenic material is moving into fields and markets where it is not allowed or wanted, 
little has been done to address the problem through the regulatory processes outlined in 
this paper.  
 
The biotechnology industry does not believe contamination is serious enough to claim 
that “co-existence” between its products and those certified organic is not possible. 
However, disbelief in “co-existence” has motivated some producers and processors to test 
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their organic products, uncovering a disturbing pattern of contamination events. As these 
two industries continue to grow side-by-side, experience with GE crops coupled with 
insufficient regulatory frameworks point to a future where contaminated organic products 
is commonplace.  
 
This is unfortunate in light of the organic industry’s efforts to ensure that strong organic 
standards were established to protect the integrity of organic products. Clearly, many 
consumers purchase organic products to avoid genetically engineered ingredients in their 
food. While consumer confidence in organic products affords the biotechnology industry 
an opportunity to point to a complete alternative to its genetically engineered products, it 
also places organic farmers in an awkward position. In the event contamination is 
detected, organic farmers must choose between maintaining the integrity of the products 
they provide to the organic market and knowingly sending contaminated products to the 
organic market. As this paper shows, the organic standards allow for an unlimited amount 
of contamination by transgenic material, as long as the excluded material was not 
intentionally used. Furthermore, the NOP does not require testing, so the extent of 
contamination in organic products is largely unknown, and will likely continue to be 
unknown, as there is no real incentive for a certifier or producer to test organic seeds and 
harvests. 
 
The NOP also places organic farmers in a vulnerable position. Consumers have 
established an implied zero tolerance for transgenic material in organic products, and 
polls show confidence in organic products as clear alternatives to GE ingredients. The 
biotechnology industry has also been influenced by consumers’ perceptions of its 
technologies, including a burgeoning interest in “consumer-oriented” traits and an 
abandonment of research projects involving herbicide-tolerant traits in popular foods, 
including wheat, lettuce, and strawberries, to name a few. The organic industry risks 
losing credibility altogether should a large part of its consumer base become aware that 
transgenic material is contaminating some organic products. And this risk is closer than 
the organic industry may like to admit, because the reality is that transgenic material has 
been entering the organic marketplace for years. The NOP and Coordinated Framework 
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do not go far enough to ensure that genetically engineered material stays contained and 
out of fields and marketplaces where it is not wanted and allowed. The two regulatory 
frameworks are not protecting the integrity of organic products, and certainly will not 
protect the integrity of organic alfalfa if Roundup Ready (RR) alfalfa is widely adopted. 
 
Thus, it seems that organic farmers should have recourses in the event genetically 
engineered material enters their crops. As part of their “organic plan,” farmers are 
supposed to implement measures to protect their crops from excluded material, including 
pesticide and transgenic drift, such as planting buffer areas and purchasing organically 
produced seed. Yet farmers who grow herbicide-tolerant crops are not bound to any 
planting restrictions to mitigate the movement of transgenes to their neighbors’ fields. 
Therefore, organic farmers are left with the economic and agronomic costs of detecting 
and eradicating GE material, taking measures to avoid future contamination, and 
receiving a lower price for their products (unless they send the contaminated product to 
the organic market). 
 
USDA does not view GE and organic crops as different from conventionally raised crops. 
Still, the NOP establishes labeling for certified organic crops, while the Coordinated 
Framework does not, which is curious: GE crops are patented, meaning the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office has determined them to be “novel.” The history of plant patents 
involves intense debates and litigation. According to Daniel Charles, author of Lords of 
the Harvest: Biotech, Big Money, and the Future of Food, patents are the “bedrock on 
which the biotechnology industry is built.”449 He writes that the industry learned early on 
that discoveries are only useful if they lead to a “proprietary position,” in his words: 
“something approaching monopoly.”450  
 
Biotechnology companies capitalize off current patent law to maintain not just profit, but 
control over markets, and ultimately, farmers. Only, the effects reach further than patent 
numbers on seed bags and royalty fees to the company. Seeds tie farmers to the land, to 
                                                 
449 Charles, D. (2001). Lords of the harvest: Biotech, big money, and the future of food, Cambridge, MA: 
Perseus Publishing. 
450 Ibid.  
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their livelihood, and this relationship is altered when seeds are owned by the companies 
producing them even after money is exchanged, even after the seed is sown. Of course, 
seeds are unique pieces of property: they self-propagate. Patents follow transgenes 
wherever they turn up, including a neighbor’s field. The legal issues around patented 
seeds are numerous. There are liability risks around contamination of conventional crops, 
and contract law issues concerning license agreements (Monsanto’s Technology 
Agreements), including the misuse of the technology.451 Additionally, liability concerns 
associated with non-GE seed and marketing contracts include contamination of crops 
destined for non-GE markets, the consequence of which forces the farmer to find and pay 
for a replacement crop or compensate the buyer.452 Again, the onus of dealing with 
unwanted GE material falls squarely on the shoulders of non-GE producers; yet, in many 
cases, the contamination is not the farmer’s fault. It begs the question: Is this a case for 
the U.S. courts?  
 
One legal scholar has written extensively about the potential role of the U.S. judicial 
system in conventional and organic contamination events involving agricultural 
biotechnology. Drew L. Kershen’s law review articles explore recourses farmers can take 
in the event they are contaminated by GE material by placing the contamination event 
into the context of the following claims: civil and strict liability; damage to property, 
person, and economic interests (markets); trespass; negligence; and private nuisance.453 
Four of these claims—trespass, nuisance, strict liability, and negligence—are part of a 
lawsuit filed on behalf of all certified organic farmers in Saskatchewan. The lawsuit seeks 
compensation from Monsanto and Aventis Cropscience for damage to organic canola 
                                                 
451 McEowen, R.A. (2004). Legal issues related to the use and ownership of genetically modified 
organisms, 43 Washburn L.J. 611. 
452 Moeller, D. (2001). GMO liability threats for farmers: Legal issues surrounding the planting of 
genetically modified crops [Electronic version], Farmers’ Legal Action Group, Retrieved on May 8, 2006, 
from http://www.mindfully.org/GE/GE3/GMO-Liability-For-FarmersNov01.htm
453 For thorough examinations of these recourses and liability issues in general, see the following articles: 
Kershen, D. L. (2002). Legal liability issues in agricultural biotechnology, The National Agricultural Law 
Center, Retrieved on May 2, 2006 from www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/kershen_biotech.pdf; 
Kershen, D. L. (2004). Of straying crops and patent rights, Washburn Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 575-
610; McEowen, R.A. (2004). Legal issues related to the use and ownership of genetically modified 
organisms, 43 Washburn L.J. 611. 
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farmers by the companies’ GE varieties.454 According to the 2002 Saskatchewan Organic 
Directorate press release, “The claim alleges that GE canola has spread across the prairies 
and contaminated conventional crops so extensively that most certified organic grain 
farmers no longer attempt to grow canola.”455 In May 2005, the judge rejected the case as 
a class-action lawsuit; the two farmers filed an appeal the same month.456 The appeal was 
granted and the class action lawsuit status is still to be determined.  
 
Perhaps the most notable and publicized case involving contamination by transgenic 
crops is another Canadian case, Monsanto Company vs. Percy Schmeiser.  Percy 
Schmeiser, a canola breeder and farmer, was found guilty of patent infringement for 
having Monsanto’s patented canola genes on his property. In an appeal to the Supreme 
Court, he argued that his canola was contaminated by Monsanto’s traits and that he 
should not be liable for possessing unwanted patented traits in his plants—traits that 
ruined years of careful canola breeding. In a close decision, the Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled in favor of Monsanto, deciding that it did not matter how the GE material made its 
way onto his property and into his plants, that he was guilty for possessing Monsanto’s 
patented genes without a license.  
 
Legal scholars expect litigation to play a role in future U.S. contamination lawsuits, 
similar to the two cases described above. Although U.S. courts have not seen an organic 
contamination case, the U.S. Court for the Northern District of California will soon play 
an important role in the future of RR alfalfa, which, as revealed in this paper, has the 
potential to significantly affect the organic industry. The potential implications of 
introducing RR alfalfa into the environment and marketplace point to many economic, 
agronomic, and environmental risks, including: chemical drift from an increase in 
herbicide use, gene flow from RR alfalfa to organic, conventional, and feral alfalfa, 
market rejection due to organic and export product contamination, economic risks to 
                                                 
454 Kershen, D. L. (2002). Legal liability issues in agricultural biotechnology, The National Agricultural 
Law Center, Retrieved on May 2, 2006 from 
www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/kershen_biotech.pdf
455 Saskatchewan Organic Directorate. (2002, January 10). Organic farmers sue Monsanto and Aventis, 
Retrieved on November 18, 2006 from http://www.saskorganic.com/oapf/news.html#pr-rel-8nov04  
456 Organic farmers dig in for another court challenge. (2005, May 27). Regina Leader-Post, Retrieved on 
November 12, 2006, from www.saskorganic.com/oapf/pdf/Organic_farmers_dig_in_SP.pdf  
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honey and sprout industries, and impacts to foundation and certified alfalfa seed—an 
important component to U.S. food and agriculture security. APHIS did not heed many of 
these concerns in approving RR alfalfa for commercial production, concerns voiced by 
over 500 citizens during the RR alfalfa comment period. Thus, the agency’s decision 
spurred the first lawsuit to be filed in response to the approval of a single GE crop. In 
February 2006, alfalfa seed producers (including an organic producer) and several public 
interest organizations filed a lawsuit against the USDA for its approval of RR alfalfa. The 
case is still pending, and if the plaintiffs succeed, the court may require APHIS to 
conduct a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and an injunction on further sales 
of RR alfalfa. 
 
Practicing Democracy: Local Initiatives Go Further Than Federal Rules 
 
More progress on protecting organic farming from GE crops has been made through local 
initiatives than in the U.S. courtroom. These local initiatives seek to address the 
shortcomings of federal regulations governing GE crops, and to ultimately avoid 
scenarios similar to the cases explained above. The community actions have garnered 
much attention, and are laudable forces effecting change at the local level. Although no 
state has ever enacted regulations governing GE crops, five counties in California have 
passed initiatives that place limitations on agricultural biotechnology, most of which ban 
growing genetically engineered crops.457 And nearly 100 New England towns have 
passed resolutions regarding GE crops, almost a quarter of which call for local moratoria 
on planting GE seeds.458  
 
Though these local initiatives typically cover a relatively small area and population, 
biotechnology companies have responded vigorously by proposing a series of preemption 
bills aimed to dissolve local and state control over seeds and plants. According to the Pew 
Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, “Preemption bills represented the single largest 
                                                 
457 Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. (2005). State legislative activity related to agricultural 
biotechnology in 2005, Retrieved on November 15, 2006 from 
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/legislation/factsheet.php
458 Background: Industry aims to strip local control of food supply. (2006). Environmental Commons,  
Retrieved on November 17, 2006 from http://environmentalcommons.org/seedlawbackgrounder.html  
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share of adopted state legislation on agricultural biotechnology in 2005 (40 percent of all 
bills adopted).”459 As of August 2006, these preemption bills have been successful in 15 
states.460 Opponents of the preemption bills believe they undermine democracy and local 
control over public health issues, and take away communities’ right “to address important 
gaps in federal and state policy.”461 Specifically, to address problems pertaining to GE 
crops that are not adequately addressed by federal regulations.462
 
While these local efforts help mitigate potential risks of GE seeds and crops, can the 
federal regulations be changed to properly address the problems that local initiatives try 
to remedy? What will it take to keep biotechnology out of organic products? I conclude 
that the only way the integrity of organic agriculture can be protected is to ban 
genetically engineered crops from agricultural fields. Numerous scientists argue that 
complete containment is not possible, that the continued movement of transgenes into 
markets that reject genetically engineered products is a certainty. Additionally, a 
precautionary approach to GE crops is warranted for several reasons: regulatory 
frameworks are not adequate to address the uncontrollable nature of these living 
technologies, and reversing contamination events is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
which compromises the safety of the food system and environment should evidence 
surface that the technology is harmful.  
 
Still, the companies producing seed technologies have convinced government agencies 
that the technology does not pose any new risks and that “co-existence” is a reality. 
Barring the removal of genetically engineered seeds and plants from the environment and 
marketplace, there are several steps that can be taken to lessen the impact of genetically 
engineered crops on the organic industry. Below are five policy recommendations that 
                                                 
459 Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. (2005). State legislative activity related to agricultural 
biotechnology in 2005, Retrieved on November 15, 2006 from 
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/legislation/factsheet.php
460 Seed & plant preemption law by state. (2006). Environmental Commons, Retrieved on November 18, 
2006 from http://environmentalcommons.org/image/seed-preemption-map.jpg
461 Background: Industry aims to strip local control of food supply. (2006). Environmental Commons,  
Retrieved on November 17, 2006 from http://environmentalcommons.org/seedlawbackgrounder.html
462 Tokar, B. (2006, June). Deficiencies in federal regulatory oversight of genetically engineered crops, 
Retrieved on June 1, 2006 from http://environmentalcommons.org/RegulatoryDeficiencies.html  
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address issues associated with the unwanted contamination of organic products by GE 
material. 
 
1) The Process for Regulating GE Crops Needs a Major Overhaul 
 
APHIS’ oversight of GE crops needs to be improved, starting with field trials. First, 
recommendations given by the Inspector General of Agriculture in its 2004 audit report 
on APHIS’ oversight of field trials should be adopted. Clearly, both organic and 
conventional crops risk contamination by GE crops not approved for commercial use. 
Strengthening field trial oversight could involve more involvement of state agriculture 
departments. For deregulated crops, a monitoring program should be implemented as a 
way to identify risks not identified in risk assessments during field trials. Most 
significantly, USDA should require growers of GE crops to establish buffer areas and 
other containment measures to mitigate pollen flow from RR crops to neighboring fields. 
USDA should also require patent holders to fund a bond that is available to organic and 
conventional farmers who are harmed by contamination of their technologies.463  
 
2) The Government Needs to Protect the Public Interest 
 
USDA should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of contamination in organic and 
conventional seeds, including foundation and certified seed, as well as food products, to 
determine the extent and content of genetic contamination in non-GE products. Such an 
evaluation would allow the government to begin owning up to its responsibility to protect 
the public interest. Both the FDA and USDA claim that organic products are alternatives 
to GE food, and must ensure that consumers continue to have a choice between the two. 
 
                                                 
463 A similar bond was introduced through legislation in Montana, but died in the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation in 2003. Senate Bill 266 said that “Any company holding a patent for 
genetically engineered wheat varieties that wishes to begin commercial production in Montana must post a 
$10M bond with the newly formed Wheat Bond Board. Legislation also outlines the membership and 
duties of the board and stipulates that a company's liability is not limited to the bond value.” (Pew Initiative 
on Food and Biotechnology. (2005). State legislative activity related to agricultural biotechnology in 2005, 
Retrieved on November 15, 2006 from 
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/legislation/factsheet.php) 
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3) The Organic Industry Must Confront Contamination  
 
The organic industry cannot ignore the contamination issue. Even if the standards allow 
for the unintended presence of transgenic material in organic products, consumers 
deserve to know the reality of contamination, and should be mobilized to protect the 
integrity of organic products. The NOP was built on transparency, and not addressing the 
contamination issue now will lead to future problems that may prove irreversible, 
including losing consumers’ confidence in the organic label. The organic industry fought 
hard for standards that reflect several principles inherent within organic agriculture 
during the beginning phases of the NOP, and excluding GE products was an important 
component of this value system. 
 
4) The Organic Industry Should Discuss the Issues of Testing and Tolerance Levels 
 
The testing and tolerance issues need to be discussed by the organic industry to weigh the 
benefits and risks of establishing a tolerance level for transgenic material in organic 
products, as well as possibly imposing a testing system (perhaps for seeds). Currently, the 
standards do not set a limit for an allowable amount of unwanted transgenic material in 
organic products. Without testing, the amount and extent of contamination remains 
largely unknown. So, there is no scientific basis to determine and enforce tolerance 
levels. Because the onus of protecting organic products from transgenic contamination is 
on the organic producers, testing costs should not fall on their shoulders, but need to 
come from the owners of the patents and perhaps growers of the technology. The organic 
industry should discuss these two issues, and demand that the biotechnology industry 
front costs for the unwanted presence of its technology. 
 
5) RR alfalfa should be removed from the market until a full EIS is performed 
 
USDA is currently performing its first Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on a GE 
crop: RR creeping bentgrass, another perennial plant that, like alfalfa, cross-pollinates 
with relatives. USDA should do the same for RR alfalfa, paying close attention to 
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potential economic risks to regional farming practices and markets, especially organic. In 
light of precedents set by other RR crops, a precautionary approach should be taken to the 
introduction of RR alfalfa in order to protect sensitive markets and the integrity of 
organic and conventional alfalfa seed. If nothing else, RR alfalfa producers should be 
required to implement isolation distances and buffer zones to mitigate gene flow, as well 
as communicate with neighboring alfalfa farmers about the potential for transgene flow to 
surrounding plants. Neighboring farms would then be able to better protect any sensitive 
markets through cautious management and testing. 
 
Alfalfa is the starting point of countless foods. It is feed for dairy cows and beef cattle, 
for lambs, pigs, and honeybees. So, even if we do not see alfalfa on our dinner plates, it 
plays a crucial role in the food we do eat—it is a staple of the American farming diet. For 
consumers who value organic livestock products—milk and ice cream derived from cows 
not fed RR hay—this choice may disappear if RR alfalfa is widely adopted. As the 
demand for organic alfalfa grows, organic farmers may find it challenging to locate 
alfalfa seeds free of transgenic traits, as they have found it challenging in the face of GE 
corn, soybeans, and canola. And alfalfa is pervasive, covering over 22 million acres 
across the United States. Therefore, transgenic traits serve as a reminder of the 
interconnectedness of things, of the persistence of life, of plants—of pollinators. GE 
crops are already woven into the North American landscape, threads of DNA that are 
reproduced time and time again, effectively spreading a living technology for years to 
come.  
 
These policy recommendations are just a few of many that could be implemented. 
Several more steps can be taken to keep transgenic crops contained, to shift some of the 
burden to protect the organic industry onto the shoulders of the patent owner and grower 
of GE crops. However, from the perspective of the organic industry, taking a 
precautionary approach to this technology seems ideal. The organic industry has always 
been concerned with the integrity of its products, and currently GE crops, including RR 
alfalfa, may be the biggest threat to maintaining crops and products that meet the 
collective vision of what constitutes a truly organic agriculture. The organic movement 
 102
enjoyed success the last time it mobilized in response to threats to the organic standards. 
It may be time to step up again, to a threat that was only partially dealt with at the time 
the rules were written. Although genetic engineering is an “excluded method,” its 
presence in organic products shows it is far from being totally excluded. 
 
Indeed, RR alfalfa is on the market and has been sown in several states, but its 
introduction has been relatively limited. The federal government and both the organic and 
biotechnology industries need to acknowledge the precedent that RR alfalfa follows—the 
uncontrollable nature of living technologies, the inability to keep these technologies fully 
contained and out of organic food. Protecting the integrity of organic seed and feed 
sources can begin, as so many of our food products, with alfalfa. 
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